

NCGG Working Paper Series

Citizen-Centric Governance in Haryana: Examining the Effectiveness of the RTS Act and Appeals Mechanism

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Working Paper 2026/01

June 2026



National Centre for Good Governance

Department of Administrative Reforms & Public Grievances

Ministry of personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions

Government of India

The author gratefully acknowledges the support and assistance extended by the Haryana Right to Service Commission, the State Software Development Centre, Haryana, and the Information Technology and Management Office, Haryana. He is also thankful to the consultants and young professionals at the National Centre for Good Governance (NCGG) for their valuable suggestions and feedback, and to Vijay Kumar for his assistance with the computational work. The author further expresses his sincere gratitude to Dr. Surendrakumar Bagde for his valuable guidance, encouragement, and support throughout the study.

Abstract

Using publicly available administrative data from the SARAL and AAS dashboards, this paper examines the evolution of Haryana's digital service delivery architecture and evaluates its performance between 2018 and 2025. The study first maps the layered integration of legal, digital, and accountability mechanisms across 1,015 services spanning 74 departments and identifies distinct phases in the expansion of RTS notifications, SARAL onboarding, and AAS integration. It then analyses trends in service delivery performance and appeal outcomes using indicators of statutory compliance, application processing, rejection rates, and appeal resolution.

The findings reveal a substantial expansion of citizen-facing digital services and a progressive convergence of statutory guarantees with automated accountability mechanisms. Over 108 million applications were processed through the SARAL platform during 2018–2025, with the share of applications disposed of within prescribed RTS timelines increasing from 83 percent in 2018 to 96 percent in 2025, while rejection rates declined from 8 percent to 4 percent. The Auto Appeal System recorded nearly 2.5 million appeals, resolving approximately 90 percent of them, and significantly expanded the visibility and enforcement of service delays. Departmental analysis further identifies heterogeneous patterns of onboarding, deterrence effects, and persistent compliance challenges across administrative domains.

The paper argues that Haryana's experience represents an important institutional innovation in public administration by integrating legal guarantees, digital platforms, and automated accountability within a unified service delivery framework. At the same time, it highlights important methodological challenges arising from aggregate administrative data and the absence of application-level linkages between service delivery and appeals. The study contributes to the literature on digital governance and service guarantee legislation by demonstrating both the potential and the analytical limitations of automated accountability systems in improving citizen-centric public service delivery.

Keywords: RTS, SARAL, AAS, Citizen-Centric Governance, Haryana.

Section I

Introduction

The timely provision of public services is widely recognized as a cornerstone of effective governance. Citizens most frequently interact with the state through routine transactions such as obtaining certificates, licenses, welfare benefits, and permits. The efficiency of these interactions not only determines their immediate satisfaction but also shapes broader perceptions of state capacity, legitimacy, and fairness. Delays and procedural bottlenecks have been shown to weaken institutional trust and disproportionately burden vulnerable groups, while predictable and accessible services enhance accountability, transparency, and social equity (World Bank, 2018; UNDESA, 2020). From an economic perspective, timely service delivery reduces transaction costs for households and businesses, thereby improving the overall ease of doing business and fostering economic inclusion (OECD, 2019).

Over the past two decades, governments worldwide have pursued reforms to institutionalize timeliness in service provision. These efforts have taken diverse forms, including service guarantee legislations, citizen charters, and the adoption of digital platforms that improve both accessibility and accountability (Bovens & Zouridis, 2002; Dunleavy et al., 2006). In India, this global trend has found expression in the enactment of Right to Service (RTS) laws across several states, which transform service delivery from an administrative function into a legally enforceable entitlement. Pioneering states such as Madhya Pradesh (2010) and Bihar (2011) set a precedent for treating timely access to services as a matter of right rather than administrative discretion. This momentum paved the way for the Haryana Right to Service Act, 2014, which represented both a legal and institutional response to persistent concerns about accountability and delays in public service delivery.

The Haryana RTS Act, 2014, sought to guarantee the delivery of notified services within legally defined timelines, designate responsible officers, and provide a statutory appeal mechanism backed by penalties for non-compliance. By embedding timeliness into law, the Act attempted to shift service delivery from a discretionary to a rights-based framework, turning what was previously considered administrative best practice into a justiciable obligation. Over the following decade, Haryana operationalized this vision by progressively notifying services and investing in

digital infrastructure. By 2025, 879 services had been brought under the RTS framework, with most applications processed through the Antyodaya SARAL portal, which provides a unified interface for citizens to apply for services and track their progress online.

Yet, despite this institutional progress, a critical gap persisted in the enforcement of accountability. While the Act envisioned appeals and penalties, the process remained dependent on citizens filing grievances manually—an approach that placed disproportionate burden on citizens and often undermined the effectiveness of the framework. To address this weakness, the state introduced the Automatic Appeal System (AAS) in 2021. Unlike conventional grievance-redressal mechanisms, AAS automatically generates and escalates appeals electronically once service timelines are breached, embedding accountability into the system itself rather than requiring citizen activation. Since its launch, AAS has expanded rapidly, with 751 services onboarded by December 2025.

These developments mark a transformation in Haryana's governance architecture, situating the state at the intersection of legal reform and digital innovation. However, despite the scale of these changes, there has been limited empirical inquiry into their governance outcomes. The broader literature on service guarantee laws highlights their potential to enhance accountability and citizen trust, but systematic evidence on their actual effectiveness remains sparse (Muralidharan et al., 2016; Bhatnagar, 2020).

Haryana provides an especially pertinent case for such an examination. The universe of e-services in Haryana is structured around the Antyodaya SARAL platform, which serves as the single-window system for citizen access. As on 24th November 2025, the platform hosts 1,015 services spanning 74 departments, of which 879 have been formally notified under the RTS Act, 2014, thereby bringing them under a legally enforceable framework of timeliness and accountability. Of these, 751 services have also been integrated with the Automatic Appeal System (AAS), ensuring that breaches of delivery timelines automatically trigger the appeals mechanism without requiring citizen intervention. This layered integration—SARAL as the digital interface, RTS as the statutory guarantee, and AAS as the appeal mechanism—marks a distinctive institutional architecture that combines administrative, legal, and technological innovations. Unlike earlier approaches where service delivery reforms were fragmented, the Haryana model represents a sequencing of reforms that progressively expand both the scope of services covered and the depth

of accountability mechanisms applied. This configuration provides a unique empirical setting to assess not only the breadth of coverage across departments but also the effectiveness of embedding accountability into the very design of digital service delivery.

This paper seeks to contribute to this emerging literature by analyzing the institutional trajectory of RTS and AAS in Haryana and evaluating their implications for timeliness, accountability, and accessibility of public services. By situating Haryana's experience within the wider discourse on governance reforms and digital service delivery, the study addresses a crucial gap between the normative claims of service guarantee legislations and their empirical performance in practice.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional context underpinning the evolution of RTS in Haryana. Section 3 reviews the existing literature on public service delivery and related themes. Section 4 presents the data sources and elaborates the ways of using the available data in the most possible feasible manner. In section 5, we discuss the evolution of the layered integration of SARAL-RTS-AAS. Section 6 then delineates the service delivery performance

Section II

Institutional Context

Prior to the enactment of the Haryana Right to Service Act in 2014, service delivery across the state reflected characteristics typical of traditional administrative systems — variable processing times, multiple touchpoints, limited transparency, and weak enforcement. The growing momentum of the Right to Public Services movement at the national level, with Madhya Pradesh (2010) and Bihar (2011) enacting similar legislation, created a normative expectation that timely access to services should be treated as a citizen entitlement rather than administrative discretion. The Haryana RTS Act, 2014 responded to this context by making it obligatory for departments to notify services, prescribe delivery timelines, and designate responsible officers, while establishing a structured three-tier redressal architecture comprising the Designated Officer, the First and Second Grievance Redressal Authorities, and the Haryana Right to Service Commission as the apex oversight body. Unlike earlier citizen charters, which relied on administrative goodwill, the Act made timeliness a statutory obligation enforceable through penalties of up to ₹20,000 on defaulting officers and compensation of up to ₹5,000 to affected citizens. Section 17 of the Act additionally

empowers the Commission to take suo motu notice of delays, recommend departmental action, and suggest process improvements — a mandate the Commission has actively exercised, disposing of 234 complaints and issuing 64 notices in 2023–24 alone (HRTSC Report, 2023-24).

To operationalise the RTS framework and provide citizens with a unified digital access point, the Government of Haryana launched the Antyodaya SARAL portal in December 2018 as a unified single-window system for all government-to-citizen services. Starting with 485 services across 37 departments, SARAL has since expanded to host 1,015 services spanning 73 departments, of which 879 are notified under the RTS Act. Departments such as Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP), Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam (DHBVN), and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam (UHBVN) together account for a large share of these services, reflecting the concentration of digital service delivery in key infrastructure and urban governance domains. The portal enables online application submission, real-time tracking, payment integration, and SMS-based notifications, while over 100 SARAL Kendras and more than 14,000 Common Service Centres extend access to citizens with limited digital connectivity. From an administrative perspective, SARAL introduced workflow automation and dashboard-based monitoring, enabling departments to track pending applications and review compliance with statutory timelines. By providing over 1000 services and schemes on a single platform, SARAL has reduced fragmentation, minimised the need for multiple departmental interactions and aimed to lower transaction costs for citizens. Services are delivered through multiple modes depending on their nature; digitally for certificates, approvals, and authorisations; through physical collection points for documents such as driving licences and ration cards; and through direct benefit transfers for welfare schemes such as pensions.

While the RTS Act established the legal guarantee of timeliness, experience from its initial years revealed that citizen appeals were rare despite widespread delays. The process for filing appeals under RTS remained manual and cumbersome, discouraging citizens from seeking redress. To address this gap, the state introduced the Automatic Appeal System (AAS) in September 2021 as a digital extension of the RTS framework. AAS automates the escalation of appeals whenever service delivery timelines are breached. Once an application crosses its statutory time limit without resolution, the system automatically generates and forwards an appeal to the concerned FGRA. If the FGRA fails to dispose of the appeal within the prescribed period, it is further escalated to the SGRA, and eventually to the Commission. This tiered escalation process is fully system-driven

and does not require the citizen to take any action, thereby embedding accountability directly into the workflow of service delivery. Notifications are sent simultaneously to both citizens and officials, creating real-time feedback loops and reducing administrative discretion. In this sense, AAS functions as the enforcement arm of the RTS Act — transforming the appeal process from a citizen-driven initiative to a system-triggered accountability mechanism. By 2025, 751 services had been integrated with AAS, covering nearly 85 percent of all RTS-notified services. This integration signifies the consolidation of Haryana’s service delivery architecture into a seamless legal–digital–accountability framework.

The Haryana experience illustrates an evolving model of institutional integration in public service delivery. The RTS Act provides the legal foundation for timeliness and accountability; SARAL ensures a citizen-facing digital interface; and AAS embeds compliance directly into the workflow. While these systems have considerably enhanced transparency and process efficiency, they also open new avenues for empirical inquiry — particularly around the relationship between legal guarantees, technological enablement, and administrative responsiveness. The following section reviews the existing literature on service guarantee laws, digital governance, and accountability mechanisms to situate the Haryana model within broader debates on state capacity and citizen-centric service delivery.

Section III

Literature review

Service-Delivery Guarantees, Digital Governance, and Automated Accountability

Public service–delivery reforms over the past two decades have increasingly centred on legal entitlements, digital platforms, and the automation of administrative processes. The Right to Service (RTS) Acts adopted by several Indian states—including Madhya Pradesh (2010), Bihar (2011), and Haryana (2014)—represent a broader shift from voluntary administrative standards to statutory guarantees. Comparative analyses show that Citizens’ Charters, though useful for transparency, lacked enforceability; by contrast, RTS frameworks formalize justiciable turnaround times (TATs), designate responsible officers, and introduce penalty and appeal mechanisms (DARPG 2010; Robinson 2016). Evidence suggests that legal enforceability reshapes incentives, but its effectiveness depends heavily on institutional capacity and monitoring systems.

Service-guarantee legislation converts aspirational standards into legally enforceable entitlements by (i) notifying specified services and statutory turnaround times (TATs), (ii) designating responsible officers and appellate authorities, and (iii) creating sanctioning mechanisms. This contrasts with Citizens' Charters which typically set standards but lack statutory enforceability and sanctions. The DARPG review of the Citizens' Charter programme highlights several structural weaknesses that limited its effectiveness as a tool for improving public service delivery. The review notes that most organizations exhibited low levels of stakeholder participation and suffered from weak communication strategies, resulting in minimal awareness among citizens and even among frontline staff. The standards and service commitments articulated in many Charters were either poorly defined, ambiguous, or inadequately specified, reducing their operational value. The Charters also had very low visibility, both externally in the public domain and internally within departments, which undermined their ability to function as instruments of accountability.

Furthermore, the review points out that most organisations lacked mechanisms to ensure compliance with the stated commitments and had no structured system for monitoring, reviewing, or evaluating performance against Charter standards. Resource support—financial, technical, and administrative—for realizing the Charter's goals was also largely absent. Importantly, the programme had no strategy for differentiating performers from non-performers, meaning that adherence to Charter commitments carried little consequence or incentive.

Despite their statutory strength, evaluations of early RTS implementation highlight persistent bottlenecks. Studies find that delays often continued because grievance-redressal mechanisms required physical filing, citizen awareness remained low, and data systems were fragmented (Robinson 2016; state implementation reviews). Weak uptake of appeals undermined the deterrent effect of penalties, resulting in a significant gap between delays recorded in administrative logs and the volume of formal complaints. This disjunction between *legal rights* and *actual enforcement* is a central theme in the literature and is directly pertinent to Haryana, where appeal volumes remained extremely low before AAS, as noted in conversation with the RTS Commissioner.

Parallel research in digital governance argues that portals and e-government systems improve accessibility, reduce transaction costs, and create audit trails (World Bank 2016; UN e-Government Survey). However, digitization alone seldom guarantees accountability—its effects

depend on data integrity, system integration, and the strength of backend processes. Evaluations of one-stop portals, including Antyodaya SARAL, emphasize their positive role in simplifying submissions but also document challenges such as inconsistent service onboarding, mismatch of identifiers across systems, and limited end-to-end digitization (ISPP Case Study; HIPACO reviews).

Against this backdrop, automatic escalation systems such as Haryana's Automatic Appeal System (AAS) represent a newer institutional innovation. AAS-type mechanisms are designed to reduce citizen transaction costs by initiating appeals automatically when statutory timelines are breached, thereby strengthening the enforcement pillar of service-guarantee laws. The limited literature on such automated grievance systems argues that automation can alter bureaucratic incentives, provided that (i) complete application-level time stamped data exist, (ii) linkages between service portals and appeal systems function reliably, and (iii) appellate authorities act on escalations (AAS manual; SARAL technical documentation).

The foregoing review establishes that the effectiveness of service guarantee legislation depends critically on the enforcement mechanisms embedded within it, the digital infrastructure available for monitoring, and the quality of administrative data used to assess compliance. In the Haryana context, these three dimensions correspond precisely to the RTS Act, the SARAL portal, and the AAS dashboard; the three data sources on which this study draws. The following section describes the data architecture, and analytical framework used to construct the empirical analysis.

Section IV

Data and Analytical Framework

4.1 Data Sources

This study draws on two publicly available administrative data sources: the Antyodaya SARAL portal dashboard and the Automatic Appeal System (AAS) dashboard, both maintained by the Government of Haryana. These dashboards present aggregate administrative records on the functioning of the RTS in Haryana. While both sources carry significant analytical value, they also impose constraints that shape the scope and design of the empirical analysis. We discuss each source in detail below and also note the data constraints.

The Antyodaya SARAL Dashboard

The SARAL dashboard provides aggregate data on the volume of applications received, processed, and rejected across Haryana's e-governance platform. The data are available at multiple levels of aggregation: system-wide totals, department-level breakdowns, service-level breakdowns, and district-level distributions. Year-wise data are available at the system-wide level only, enabling longitudinal analysis of aggregate trends in application volumes and service delivery performance from 2018 to 2025. However, year-wise disaggregation is not available at the department, service, or district level. This constrains the empirical analysis in an important way: while temporal trends in compliance and processing can be examined at the system level, year-on-year variation across individual departments or services cannot be tracked directly from the dashboard. The cross-sectional department-wise analysis in this study therefore reflects a cumulative snapshot of performance over the entire period rather than a year-on-year.

From the SARAL dashboard, we extract four core variables: total applications received, total applications processed, total applications processed within the prescribed RTS timeline, and total applications rejected. These four variables, in combination, allow the construction of a set of performance indicators; the timely processing rate, the overall completion rate, the rejection rate, and the pending ratio; that form the empirical basis for assessing service delivery performance across departments and over time.

The AAS Dashboard

The Automatic Appeal System dashboard provides real-time aggregate data on appeals generated, resolved, escalated, and in-process (pending) across the three statutory tiers of the appellate mechanism: FGRA, the SGRA, and HRTSC. For each tier, the dashboard records the total number of appeals in each of three states — resolved, escalated, and in process — along with the aggregate total. These figures are further disaggregated by department, service, and district, enabling cross-sectional comparison of appeal volumes and resolution rates across administrative domains.

The dashboard does not, however, directly provide year-wise appeal data. The figures displayed are cumulative counts from the inception of AAS in September 2021 to the date of access (we had accessed it as on 26th February, 2026) and are updated in real time as new appeals are generated and existing ones are disposed of. To construct the year-wise appeal series used in the temporal analysis of this study, we downloaded the full cumulative appeal data at multiple points in time and computed annual additions to construct the full data.

A further and more fundamental constraint is the absence of a data linkage between the SARAL portal and the AAS dashboard at the individual application level. They maintain separate data architectures, and no publicly accessible dataset links a specific SARAL application to its corresponding AAS appeal record. This means it is not possible to compute, from public data alone, the proportion of individual applications that result in appeals; a measure that would directly capture the per-application rate of non-compliance. The analysis therefore relies on appeal volumes and shares as proxies for enforcement intensity rather than as direct measures of application-level compliance failure. The implications of this constraint for causal interpretation are discussed in Section 4.3.

4.2 Analytical Framework and Indicators

The empirical analysis is organised around two sets of performance indicators, corresponding to the two dimensions of the RTS–AAS framework: service delivery performance and appeal system performance.

For service delivery performance, we construct four indicators from the SARAL data. The *RTS compliance rate* defined as the ratio of applications processed within statutory timelines to total applications processed is the primary measure of timeliness and statutory adherence. It captures the extent to which departments are meeting their legal obligations under the RTS Act and is the indicator most directly relevant to the framework's core purpose. The *overall completion rate*, defined as total processed applications as a proportion of total received, measures administrative throughput and system responsiveness, providing a check on whether backlogs are accumulating. The *rejection rate* defined as applications rejected as a share of total received, serves as a diagnostic indicator of procedural barriers; sustained high rejection rates may signal documentation requirements that citizens find difficult to meet or eligibility conditions that are poorly communicated. The *pending rate* — applications pending beyond RTS timelines as a proportion of total received — captures the stock of unresolved delayed cases and provides a measure of systemic bottlenecks. These indicators are computed at the system level for the temporal analysis and at the department level for the cross-sectional analysis; the construction formulae are summarised in Table 3.

For appeal system performance, we construct three indicators from the AAS data. The *appeal resolution rate* — resolved appeals as a proportion of total appeals — measures the operational

effectiveness of the appellate mechanism. The *escalation rate* defined as appeals escalated to a higher tier as a proportion of total appeals at the tier below, captures the extent to which cases that cannot be resolved at one level are being appropriately referred upward and serves as a measure of first-tier redressal adequacy. The *in-process rate*, as the ratio of appeals currently pending and total appeals is a measure of systemic pendency and appellate backlog. Additionally, at the aggregate temporal level, we also construct the *appeal share*; appeals as a proportion of total processed applications each year. This is to examine how the intensity of enforcement has evolved relative to the scale of service delivery. We also construct the *appeals-to-breached-applications ratio* — dividing total annual appeals by the number of applications processed outside statutory timelines in the same year — as an indicator of AAS coverage, measuring what proportion of actual compliance failures are being captured by the automated enforcement system.

To enable structured inter-departmental comparison that integrates both service delivery and appeal performance dimensions, we further construct a composite *RTS Performance Index (RPI)* for each department. The RPI combines four component indicators — timeliness, appeal pressure, resolution strength, and escalation severity — through min-max normalisation, assigning equal weight to each component. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger overall performance. The construction methodology, the choice and justification of components, and the results of the index are presented in Section VII.

4.3 Analytical Approach and Its Limitations

The analytical approach adopted in this study is primarily descriptive and comparative. Given the aggregate nature of the available data, the analysis examines trends over time, cross-sectional variation across departments, and the association between AAS introduction and observed changes in compliance indicators. It does not claim causal identification of the AAS effect; the absence of application-level panel data precludes the application of the quasi-experimental estimators — difference-in-differences, event-study, or staggered adoption designs — that would be required to isolate the AAS effect from concurrent trends such as the post-pandemic administrative recovery, the continued expansion of service coverage, and improvements in citizen digital literacy.

The principal inferential strategy is temporal association: the compliance improvement observed at the system level is precisely timed relative to AAS introduction in September 2021, is sustained across four subsequent years, is of substantial magnitude (approximately 11 percentage points in a single year), and is corroborated by a simultaneous decline in rejection rates that rules out selective screening as an alternative

explanation. At the department level, the analysis strengthens the inferential case by combining appeal share trends with year-wise AAS onboarding records, identifying four empirically distinct patterns of departmental response that are consistent with the onboarding shock and deterrence mechanisms predicted by the theoretical framework, even in the absence of application-level data.

Two additional limitations of the data warrant explicit acknowledgement. First, the SARAL and AAS dashboards present administrative outcomes — applications processed, appeals resolved — without information on the quality of those outcomes. An application recorded as processed within the RTS timeline may nonetheless have resulted in an incorrect, incomplete, or unsatisfactory service delivery; the compliance rate captures procedural timeliness rather than substantive quality. Second, the dashboard data represent the population of applications submitted through the SARAL platform and do not capture citizen interactions with services that remain outside the portal. These limitations point directly to the future research agenda described in Section X.

Snapshot of the Digital Service Delivery Architecture in Haryana

We present a consolidated snapshot of Haryana’s digital service delivery architecture by mapping departmental services across three institutional layers; SARAL, RTS, and AAS. This mapping allows us to situate individual services within a unified framework, as said above, that links digital access, statutory guarantees, and automated enforcement mechanisms¹.

As on 24th November 2025, the SARAL platform hosts 1,015 e-services across 73 departments. Of these, 879 services are notified under the RTS Act, indicating that a substantial proportion of digitally available services are backed by legally prescribed timelines. Further, 751 services have been onboarded on AAS, enabling automatic generation and escalation of appeals in cases of delay. A total of 719 services is common across all three layers—SARAL, RTS, and AAS—forming the core set of services that are digitally accessible, statutorily guaranteed, and subject to automated accountability.

The table also reveals heterogeneity across departments in terms of alignment between SARAL, RTS, and AAS. Several departments, including universities, electricity distribution utilities, labour welfare institutions, and select regulatory bodies, display near-complete convergence across the

¹ Each of the institutional platforms; SARAL, RTS and AAS, maintain its distinct data architectures, resulting in variations in service categorization, departmental structuring, and nomenclature. A systematic mapping exercise was therefore undertaken to construct a unified and internally consistent RTS–SARAL–AAS service architecture for this study. Please refer to the Appendix for a fuller description of our mapping exercise.

three systems. In contrast, other departments show partial overlap, with some SARAL services not notified under RTS and some RTS-notified services not yet reflected as onboarded

Table 1: Digital Service Delivery Architecture in Haryana

Sl. No.	Department Name	E-Services (SARAL)	RTS Notified	AAS Onboarded	SARAL-RTS-AAS	SARAL but not RTS
1	Agriculture Department	23	12	8	8	11
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying	12	6	6	6	6
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonepat)	4	4	4	4	
4	Board of School Education Haryana	3	3	3	3	
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board	25	25	25	25	
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani	4	4	4	4	
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa	4	4	4	4	
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind	4	4	4	4	
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department	11	11	11	11	
10	Chief Minister Relief Fund	1				1
11	Citizen Resource Information Department	1				1
12	Cooperation Department	1	1	1	1	
13	Dada Lakshmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts	4	4	4	4	
14	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN	67	63	63	59	4
15	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonapat	4	4	4	4	
16	Department of Ayush	4	4			
17	Department of Mines & Geology	11	11	7	7	
18	Development and Panchayats Department	1	1	1	1	
19	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana	11	11	7	7	
20	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages	3	2	2	2	1
21	Directorate of MSME	55	51	48	44	4
22	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat	4	4	4	4	
23	Elementary Education Department Haryana	3				3
24	Employment Department	9	9	8	8	
25	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority	15	15	8	8	
26	Fisheries Department	46	46	42	41	
27	Food and Drug Administration	4	4			
28	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department	13	13	8	8	
29	General Administration	1				1
30	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar	8	8	8	8	
31	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority	15	15	8	8	
32	Gurugram University, Gurugram	4	4	4	4	
33	Haryana Backward Classes and Economically Weaker Sections Kalyan Nigam	22				22
34	Haryana Excise & Taxation	23	23	23	23	
35	Haryana Forest Department	6	6	2	2	
36	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)	21	21	21	21	
37	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation	9	4			5
38	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran	76	73	68	68	3
39	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)	11	11	11	11	
40	Haryana State Board of Technical Education	4	4	4	4	
41	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	29	29	19	19	
42	Haryana State Pollution Control Board	15	10			5
43	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency	3	3	3	3	
44	Haryana Women Development Corporation	3	3	3	3	
45	Health Services Department	5	5	5	5	
46	Higher Education Department	8				8
47	Home Department	14	5			9
48	Horticulture Department	5	3	3	3	2
49	Housing Board	10	10	10	10	
50	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)	4	4	4	4	
51	Industries and Commerce Department	46	44	42	4	2
52	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad	4	4	4	4	
53	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra	4	4	4	4	
54	Labour Department	14	11	8	7	3
55	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak	4	4	4	4	
56	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal	4	4	4	4	
57	Police Department	32	21	19	17	11
58	Printing And Stationery Department	1	1	1	1	
59	Public Health And Engineering-PHED	12	12	8	8	
60	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)	8	8	3	3	
61	Renewable Energy Department	4				4
62	Revenue & Disaster Management Department	32	28	11	1	4
63	Rural Development Department, Haryana	1	1	1	1	
64	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department	19	18	19	18	1
65	Science and Technology Department	2	2	2	2	
66	Secondary Education Department Haryana	4	3			1
67	Social Justice And Empowerment	15	12	11	1	3
68	Town And Country Planning	26	9	12	3	17

69	Transport Department	35	34	34	34	1
70	Urban Local Bodies	3	29	24	2	1
71	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN	61	61	55	55	
72	Welfare of SCs And BCs	7	5	6	4	2
73	Women and Child Development Department	7	7	7	7	
	Grand Total	1015	879	751	719	138

on AAS. At the aggregate level, 138 services available on SARAL are not notified under RTS. These patterns point to differences in the sequencing and pace of service notification, digital integration, and appeal automation across departments.

Taken together, this snapshot offers a cross-sectional view of how services are positioned across SARAL, the RTS framework, and the Auto Appeal System at a given point in time. While it captures the breadth and institutional spread of Haryana's digital service delivery architecture, it does not convey how this configuration has evolved over time. To understand the dynamics of service expansion, statutory notification, and the progressive integration of accountability mechanisms, it is necessary to examine the temporal trajectory of these systems. The following sections therefore move from this static overview to a detailed year-wise analysis of RTS service notifications, SARAL onboarding, and AAS integration, tracing how the service delivery framework in Haryana has developed and adapted over successive phases of implementation.

Section V

5.1 Evolution of RTS Notified services, SARAL onboarded and AAS onboarded services

The expansion of Haryana's Right to Service framework across its three institutional dimensions —SARAL, RTS and AAS— reflects a phased and uneven process of administrative reform rather than a uniform or centrally planned rollout. Figure 1 captures this trajectory across all three dimensions simultaneously, presenting both cumulative coverage and annual additions over the period 2015 to 2025. Taken together, the data reveal a process of layered institutionalisation in which legal, digital, and accountability mechanisms were introduced sequentially and expanded at different speeds and through different departmental pathways².

Phase I (2015–2018): Statutory Foundation without Digital Infrastructure

The first phase was characterised by rapid statutory notification but the near-absence of digital onboarding. Between 2015 and 2017, approximately 305 services were notified under the RTS Act across departments with established citizen-facing functions — Revenue and Disaster

² In the annexures, we provide the department-year wise number of services on all three platforms separately. See annexures 1, 2 and 3.

Management, Home, Industries and Commerce, Energy, and Food and Civil Supplies featured prominently. However, SARAL was not yet operational during this period, having been launched only in December 2018, and AAS did not exist. As a result, the RTS framework during Phase I operated largely through departmental channels and manual processes, with appeal mechanisms formally notified but not integrated into any digital monitoring or tracking system. The 2018 notifications on SARAL were limited to 10 services, confirming that the portal's initial rollout was selective and gradual. This phase established the legal architecture of the framework but left its enforcement and digital dimensions substantially underdeveloped.

Phase II (2019–2021): Digital Integration and the Onset of Automated Accountability

The second phase witnessed a gradual convergence between statutory notification and digital operationalisation, culminating in the introduction of AAS. Between 2019 and 2021, 193 additional services were notified under the RTS Act, while SARAL onboarded 127 RTS-notified services during the same period — reflecting an accelerating but still incomplete alignment between the legal and digital layers. The departments active during this phase — Fisheries, Industries and Commerce, MSME, Transport, and HSIIDC — were characterised by high application volumes and complex regulatory workflows, suggesting that SARAL onboarding was being extended to departments where the efficiency gains from digitisation were most apparent.

The pivotal institutional development of this phase was the introduction of AAS in September 2021, with an initial cohort of 60 services drawn from DHBVN, UHBVN, Revenue and Disaster Management, and Social Justice and Empowerment. This marked the transition from a framework in which accountability depended entirely on citizen initiative to one in which enforcement was embedded in the administrative workflow itself. However, as of end-2021, the cumulative SARAL coverage stood at 231 services and AAS at only 60, indicating that the accountability architecture remained partial and unevenly distributed across the service universe.

Phase III (2022–2025): Acceleration, Consolidation, and Residual Gaps

The third phase is characterised by the most rapid and wide-ranging expansion across all three dimensions, though with notable divergences in pace and pattern between them. On the statutory side, 381 additional services were notified under the RTS Act between 2022 and 2025, with the largest single-year addition occurring in 2022 (210 services), driven by Town and Country Planning, Energy, Revenue, and Urban Local Bodies. SARAL onboarding during this phase


followed a different temporal pattern: additions peaked in 2023 (199 services) and 2025 (239 services) rather than in 2022, revealing a systematic lag between gazette notification and digital operationalisation. This lag — visible in the annual bar panel of Figure 1 as a displacement between the purple and teal bars — implies that departments require time to configure workflows, integrate legacy systems, and complete technical onboarding after a service is formally notified, a constraint that aggregate coverage statistics tend to obscure.

AAS expansion during this phase was equally dramatic. Following the large-scale onboarding of 280 services in 2022, the system underwent a period of consolidation in 2023 (50 additions) and 2024 (42 additions), during which attention shifted to strengthening integration and refining escalation workflows. A dramatic resurgence followed in 2025, with 319 services onboarded — the highest annual figure since the system's inception — led by UHBVN (37 services), Transport (34 services), and the Directorate of MSME (38 services). Unlike the 2022 expansion, which was primarily about establishing scale, the 2025 surge combined breadth with institutional maturity, incorporating departments that had already developed stable SARAL workflows and were therefore better positioned to absorb automated accountability mechanisms.

Patterns and Residual Gaps

By end-2025, the cumulative totals stood at 879 services notified under the RTS Act, 870 onboarded on SARAL, and 751 integrated with AAS. These figures, read in isolation, might suggest near-complete institutional alignment. However, the two gaps visible in Figure 1 carry distinct analytical implications. The first gap — nine services notified under RTS but not yet on SARAL — is administratively marginal and likely reflects services in the process of technical integration or operating through department-specific portals for regulatory reasons. The second gap — 119 services on SARAL but not yet on AAS — is more consequential. These are services that are legally guaranteed and digitally accessible but remain outside the automated enforcement architecture, meaning that timeline breaches for these services continue to depend on citizen-initiated complaints rather than system-triggered appeals. This residual accountability deficit, while substantially reduced from the pre-AAS baseline, represents the frontier of the framework's ongoing institutionalisation.

Figure 1



Source: NCGG analysis based on gazette notifications, Department of Administrative Reforms, Government of Haryana.

Across all three phases, several cross-cutting patterns are evident. First, the three dimensions of the framework — legal, digital, and accountability — were never simultaneously co-extensive; each expanded at a different pace and through different institutional channels, producing persistent but narrowing gaps between notification, onboarding, and enforcement. Second, a small set of high-volume departments — utilities, urban development agencies, revenue administration, and industrial regulatory bodies — consistently drove expansion across all three systems, reflecting both their administrative capacity and the salience of their service portfolios for citizens. Third, universities and specialised agencies entered the framework late but in coordinated batches, suggesting structured institutional adoption rather than organic diffusion. Finally, the divergence between RTS notification patterns and SARAL onboarding patterns — with SARAL additions

lagging and then accelerating relative to statutory notifications — points to the implementation gap between legal reform and administrative operationalisation that has been identified as a persistent feature of service guarantee frameworks in the Indian context more broadly.

While the preceding discussion examined the institutional expansion of the RTS framework through notification, digitisation, and automated accountability, these developments by themselves do not necessarily reveal how the system has functioned in practice. The effectiveness of such reforms ultimately depends on whether they translate into measurable improvements in the delivery of services. This requires moving beyond the architecture of reform to the operational performance of the system. Accordingly, the next section examines broad trends in service delivery performance under the Haryana RTS framework using aggregate administrative data available through the Antyodaya SARAL portal. The analysis focuses on patterns of application receipt, processing, and disposal within prescribed timelines in order to understand how the expanding institutional framework has translated into actual service delivery outcomes over time.

Section VI

6.1 Trends in Service Delivery Performance

Table 2 presents the year-wise distribution of service applications received, processed, and disposed of under the Haryana RTS framework through the Antyodaya SARAL portal between 2018 and 2025. Over this period, approximately 108 million applications were received, of which around 106 million were processed — a processing rate consistently above 96 percent across all years. Of the processed applications, roughly 94 million, or 88 percent, were disposed of within the statutorily prescribed timelines, indicating a broadly functional service delivery architecture even in the early years of the framework.

Application volumes grew substantially over the period, rising from 8.8 million in 2018 to 17.9 million in 2025 — a more than twofold increase — reflecting both the progressive expansion of services notified under the RTS Act and the growing uptake of the SARAL platform as a primary interface for citizen-state transactions.

The RTS compliance rate — defined here as the share of processed applications disposed of within statutory timelines — exhibits a discernible structural improvement over the period. Compliance stood at 83 percent in 2018, dipped to 80–81 percent during 2020–21, and then rose markedly to

91 percent in 2022, remaining above 88 percent for every subsequent year and reaching 96 percent by 2025.

Table 2: Year-wise status of applications on SARAL

Year	Received (million)	Processed (million)	Processed Within RTS (million)	Rejected (million)	% processed within RTS	% of applications rejected
2018	8.80	8.79	7.33	0.70	83	8
2019	12.70	12.04	11.01	1.34	91	11
2020	12.98	12.62	10.24	1.73	81	13
2021	12.64	12.57	10.05	1.44	80	11
2022	11.65	11.55	10.47	1.23	91	11
2023	14.62	14.38	12.72	1.30	88	9
2024	17.17	17.05	15.65	1.11	92	6
2025	17.88	17.49	16.71	0.77	96	4
Total	108.44	106.49	94.17	9.62	88	9

Source: NCGG analysis based on data collected from SARAL portal on 25.11.2025.

Notably, the Automatic Appeal System was introduced in September 2021 and expanded substantially through 2022. The timing of the compliance improvement — occurring precisely in the year following AAS operationalisation — is suggestive of a systemic effect, even though the aggregate nature of the data precludes a causal identification. The dip in 2020–21 likely reflects disruptions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent burden on administrative capacity, making the post-2021 recovery and subsequent improvement more analytically salient.

The rejection rate — applications rejected as a share of total received — declined from a peak of 13 percent in 2020 to 4 percent in 2025. While the reasons for rejection are not disaggregated in the available data, the sustained downward trend may reflect improved citizen awareness of eligibility conditions, better documentation support through SARAL Kendras and Common Service Centres, and refinements in departmental processing workflows over time. This trend also reduces the likelihood that the improvement in compliance rates is an artefact of selective processing, since a falling rejection share implies that a growing proportion of applications are being substantively disposed of rather than screened out.


Taken together, the data point to a gradual but consistent improvement in service delivery timeliness over the period, with a visible acceleration in the post-AAS years. These aggregate

patterns, while not conclusive on their own, provide a useful empirical baseline against which the introduction of the Automatic Appeal System can be situated and assessed.

'Seasonal Patterns in SARAL Application Inflows The graph 2 presents the monthly trend in SARAL applications, showing the number of applications received, processed, and processed within RTS timelines from April 2024 to March 2025.

A clear peak in application receipts is observed during July and August 2024, with July recording the highest inflow in the period under review. This surge is mirrored in the number of applications processed and those completed within RTS timelines, indicating that administrative processing capacity expanded alongside increased demand. Such mid-year peaks are plausibly associated with seasonal administrative cycles, including academic admissions (requiring income, caste, and domicile certificates), agricultural season-linked transactions, and renewal of various permits and registrations.

Figure 2: Monthly trend of SARAL Applications (April, 2024 to March, 2025)



Another rise is visible around December 2024 and January 2025, though at a comparatively lower level than the mid-year peak. This pattern may reflect end-of-year administrative clearances, financial cycle-related processing, or periodic compliance requirements across departments. Overall, the pattern suggests that SARAL application volumes are influenced by seasonal administrative and socio-economic cycles rather than abrupt structural shocks, and processing trends broadly mirror receipt trends across these peak months.

6.2 Department-wise Performance under the RTS Framework

The department-wise data on applications received, processed, completed within RTS timelines, and pending beyond RTS limits constitute a core empirical component of the study. These indicators collectively capture both the scale and efficiency of service delivery under the Haryana Right to Service (RTS) framework.

The variable applications received represents the service demand handled by each department, reflecting citizen engagement and administrative workload. Applications completed and completed within RTS timelines indicate the extent to which departments comply with the statutory time limits prescribed under the RTS Act, 2014. In contrast, applications pending beyond RTS timelines signal instances of procedural delay, capacity constraints, or systemic inefficiencies.

Taken together, these statistics allow for an assessment of departmental performance in ensuring timely service delivery. They also help identify sectors where the implementation of the RTS framework and integration with digital systems such as SARAL and the Auto Appeal System (AAS) have yielded measurable gains, and where challenges of timeliness and accountability persist.

6.3 Using Service Delivery Statistics to Measure Departmental Performance

The department-wise service delivery statistics form the basis for constructing performance indicators under the RTS framework. From these, several key measures can be derived. The RTS compliance rate, calculated as the ratio of applications completed within RTS timelines to total processed applications, provides a direct measure of timeliness and administrative efficiency. The rejection rate, obtained by dividing rejected applications by total received applications, reflects

procedural rigidity or potential barriers faced by citizens in accessing services. Similarly, the pending ratio—the proportion of applications pending beyond RTS limits—indicates service delivery bottlenecks and helps identify areas requiring managerial attention. The overall completion rate represents the share of total applications processed out of all applications received during a given period. It serves as a measure of administrative throughput and system responsiveness under the Haryana Right to Service (RTS) framework. A high completion rate indicates that departments are able to manage citizen demand effectively and maintain continuity in service delivery, while a lower rate may suggest procedural delays, data entry backlogs, or capacity constraints. When analyzed alongside the RTS compliance rate, the completion rate helps distinguish between general efficiency in processing applications and compliance with statutory timelines, offering a more nuanced view of departmental performance and institutional efficiency.

Together, these indicators offer a multidimensional assessment of performance across departments. High compliance and low pendency suggest strong adherence to statutory timelines and efficient internal workflows, whereas deviations highlight possible capacity or monitoring gaps. When examined alongside departmental service volumes, these measures help distinguish between systemic challenges (such as high demand load) and administrative inefficiencies, offering an evidence-based understanding of the functioning of Haryana’s RTS system.

Table 3: Metrics used in assessing RTS performance

Metric	Formula	Interpretation
RTS Compliance Rate (%)	$(\text{Applications completed within RTS} \div \text{Total completed applications}) \times 100$	Measures adherence to statutory timelines — a key RTS performance metric.
Overall Completion Rate (%)	$(\text{Total completed applications} \div \text{Applications received}) \times 100$	Shows how efficiently applications are being processed overall.
Pending Rate (%)	$(\text{Pending outside RTS} \div \text{Applications received}) \times 100$	Indicates backlog or delay burden.

Source: NCGG analysis

6.4 Departmental Performance Summary: RTS Compliance and Service Load (as of 2025)

The department-wise status of applications processed through the SARAL platform, presented in Annexure 5, reveals considerable heterogeneity in service delivery performance across Haryana's administrative apparatus. Departments vary not only in application volume and overall completion rates but also — and more significantly for the purposes of this study — in the relationship between completion and timely completion. These distinctions carry direct implications for interpreting the role of the RTS framework and the Automatic Appeal System.

A first group consists of high-volume departments with near-complete disposal but low within-timeline compliance. Departments such as Revenue and Disaster Management, Transport, Police, Health Services, DHBVN, UHBVN, Haryana Excise and Taxation, and Urban Local Bodies together account for a substantial share of total applications on the SARAL platform. These departments report overall completion rates consistently exceeding 99 percent and maintain pendency ratios typically below 0.25 percent, which on their face suggest strong administrative performance. However, their RTS compliance rates — defined as the share of recently completed applications disposed of within statutory timelines — range between approximately 2 and 7 percent. This divergence between near-complete disposal and low within-timeline compliance is analytically significant. It implies that applications in these departments are being processed, but frequently after the prescribed deadline has elapsed. In other words, high completion rates mask a widespread pattern of late disposal that aggregate throughput figures do not reveal. This is precisely the gap that AAS is designed to address: by automatically generating appeals when timelines are breached, it creates an accountability signal for delays that would otherwise go unrecorded and unremedied. The large application volumes in this group mean that even modest shortfalls in timely compliance translate into very large absolute numbers of delayed disposals, making these departments the most consequential for any system-wide assessment of RTS effectiveness.

A second group comprises departments with high completion rates and low pendency, where RTS compliance rates appear comparatively higher. Departments such as the Board of School

Education Haryana, Chief Electrical Inspector Department, Haryana Forest Department, Labour Department, Horticulture Department, and several statutory boards and universities fall into this category. Their higher apparent compliance rates partly reflect smaller application volumes, which means the denominator in recent completion figures is limited and individual periods of strong performance register more prominently. These departments nonetheless represent instances of relatively well-aligned disposal and timeliness, offering a useful internal reference point within the system.

A third category includes medium-volume departments with moderate performance profiles. Departments such as Industries and Commerce, Social Justice and Empowerment, Fisheries, Public Health Engineering, Housing Board, Haryana State Pollution Control Board, and Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran handle tens of thousands to a few hundred thousand applications and exhibit completion rates generally above 95 percent. RTS compliance rates in this group range between 2 and 6 percent, with pendency ratios below 1 percent. The performance pattern here mirrors that of the high-volume group in its broad structure — disposal is broadly achieved but timeliness remains incomplete — though at a scale where the absolute consequences are less pronounced.

A fourth group consists of departments with lower completion rates or elevated pendency ratios. Certain universities and departments including the Home Department, Directorate of MSME, Development and Panchayats Department, and Secondary Education Department fall here, with completion rates below 85 percent and pendency ratios in some cases exceeding 10 percent. Given their comparatively smaller application volumes, these figures are more likely to reflect localised procedural or administrative constraints rather than systemic trends. They nonetheless indicate that within-system unevenness extends beyond the timeliness dimension to encompass basic disposal as well.

Taken together, the department-wise data underscore a finding that aggregate system-level statistics tend to obscure: the RTS framework's compliance challenge in Haryana is concentrated not in departments that fail to process applications, but in departments that process applications late. The near-universal high completion rates across the system suggest that administrative capacity for disposal exists; what remains uneven is the alignment of that disposal with statutory timelines. This distinction is central to the analytical contribution of the present study, as it shifts

the evaluation of RTS effectiveness away from throughput metrics and towards timeliness compliance — the dimension the framework was specifically designed to enforce.

While the aggregate trends examined in the preceding section suggest that the introduction of AAS coincided with measurable improvements in compliance, they cannot reveal whether these improvements are attributable to the enforcement mechanism itself or to the expansion of coverage. The following section examines AAS performance directly — first at the system level, then at the departmental level — to assess the distribution, resolution, and escalation of appeals and to distinguish deterrence effects from onboarding artefacts

Section VII

7.1 Performance of the Auto Appeal System (AAS) in Haryana

AAS Aggregate Performance

Table 5 summarises the performance of Haryana’s Auto Appeal System (AAS) across its three statutory tiers — the First Grievance Redressal Authority (FGRA), Second Grievance Redressal Authority (SGRA), and the Haryana Right to Service Commission (HRTSC) — as of the latest reporting period.

A total of 2.48 million appeals has been recorded under AAS as of 29th December, 2025. Of these, the FGRA tier accounts for the overwhelming majority of appeals (over 91% of total cases), reflecting its role as the primary redressal level within the RTS framework. The SGRA tier handled approximately 8.5% of total appeals, while escalations to the Commission (HRTSC) were limited to 0.2%, indicating a steep decline in appeal volume with each successive level.

In terms of disposal, 89.9% of all appeals have been resolved, while only 1.9% remain in process and 8.2% have been escalated to higher tiers. The FGRA shows a high-resolution share of 89.3%, while the SGRA demonstrates a notably higher efficiency with 96.6% resolution. At the apex level, the HRTSC resolved 90.4% of its cases, despite its small absolute caseload.

Table 5: Appeal Status Summary by Tier (2021 to 2025)

Appeal Tier	In Process	Escalated	Resolved	Total Appeals	% In Process	% Escalated	% Resolved	% of total appeals
FGRA	42766	200737	2023523	2267026	1.89%	8.85%	89.26%	91.27%
SGRA	3909	3260	204394	211563	1.85%	1.54%	96.61%	8.52%
HRTSC	495		4658	5153	9.61%		90.39%	0.21%
Grand Total	47170	203997	2232575	2483742	1.90%	8.21%	89.89%	100%

Source: NCGG analysis based on AAS dashboard (updated as on 29.12.2025)

These figures suggest that most appeals are effectively settled at the first tier, with limited escalation required. The relatively small number of pending cases across all levels reflects a maturing appeal system with substantial administrative responsiveness embedded through automation and statutory timelines.

The aggregate picture presented above, while indicative of system-wide effectiveness, masks considerable heterogeneity across departments. The following sub-section examines how appeal volumes and shares have evolved at the departmental level, combining appeal share data with year-wise AAS service onboarding records to identify systematic patterns in administrative responsiveness.

7.2 Department-wise Performance under AAS

The department-wise data on appeals under the Auto Appeal System (AAS) provides an overview of the performance of Haryana's service delivery institutions in addressing grievances related to the Right to Service (RTS) framework. A total of about 2.48 million appeals were registered across 61 departments, with nearly 90 percent of them resolved. This indicates a high level of administrative responsiveness and the growing institutionalization of digital accountability in service delivery.

The Revenue and Disaster Management Department accounts for the highest volume of appeals, constituting around 30 percent of the total, followed by the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes Department, Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam (DHBVN), and Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (HSVP). Together, these departments handle more than half of all appeals received under AAS, reflecting both their extensive public interface and the large number of time-bound services they deliver. Other departments with a significant appeal load include

Health Services, Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam (UHBVN), Transport, and the Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED).

Across departments, resolution rates are generally high, with many departments achieving above 90 percent disposal. Departments such as Agriculture, the Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board, and the Police Department report resolution rates above 99 percent, indicating effective internal monitoring and compliance with RTS timelines.

In contrast, a few departments show higher pendency or escalation levels. The Development and Panchayats Department, Labour Department, Directorate of Fire and Emergency Services, and Women and Child Development Department record pendency rates exceeding 30 to 45 percent, suggesting delays in redressal or procedural complexity in appeals. Departments such as Urban Local Bodies and Transport also record moderate levels of pendency (25–27 percent), which may be associated with high service demand or inter-departmental dependencies.

Smaller departments, universities, and autonomous bodies have relatively limited appeal activity, often reporting full or near-full resolution rates. Institutions such as Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, the Chief Electrical Inspector Department, and the Haryana Women Development Corporation have disposed of all registered appeals, though the overall number of appeals in these entities is small.

Overall, the data indicates that the Auto Appeal System has been largely successful in ensuring timely redressal of grievances and improving compliance with statutory service timelines. However, the observed variation in escalation and pendency across departments highlights the need for targeted administrative review and process simplification in departments with higher caseloads or slower resolution rates. A full department wise table is enclosed in Annexure 6.

7.3 Service Delivery Outcomes Before and After the Introduction of AAS

The introduction of the Automatic Appeal System (AAS) in 2021 marked a structural shift in the implementation of the Haryana Right to Service (RTS) framework. By automating the escalation of delayed applications, AAS transformed the appeal process from a citizen-initiated mechanism into a system-triggered accountability instrument. To assess whether this institutional reform

coincided with measurable changes in service delivery performance, a comparative analysis of pre- and post-AAS periods is undertaken using aggregate SARAL data.

For analytical clarity, the years 2018–2020 are treated as the pre-AAS period, while 2022–2025 represent the post-AAS phase. The year 2021 is considered a transition year and is excluded from the comparison. The analysis focuses on two key indicators: the timely processing rate (applications completed within RTS timelines as a proportion of total applications received) and the rejection rate.

Table 6: Pre-AAS and Post-AAS Comparison of Service Delivery Performance

Period	Years Covered	Total Applications Received (Million)	Applications Completed Within RTS (Million)	Timely Processing Rate (%)	Total Rejections (Million)	Rejection Rate (%)
Pre-AAS	2018–2020	34.48	28.58	82.9	3.77	10.9
Post-AAS	2022–2025	61.32	55.55	90.6	4.41	7.2
Change	—	26.84	26.97	+7.7 percentage points	+0.64	–3.7 percentage points

Source: NCGG analysis based on data collected from SARAL portal on 25.11.2025.

During the pre-AAS period (2018–2020), a total of 34.48 million applications were received under the RTS framework, of which 28.58 million were completed within the prescribed timelines. This corresponds to a timely processing rate of 82.9 percent. Rejections during this period amounted to 3.77 million applications, yielding a rejection rate of 10.9 percent.

In contrast, the post-AAS period (2022–2025) witnessed a substantial increase in application volume, with 61.32 million applications received—nearly double the pre-AAS volume. Of these, 55.55 million applications were completed within RTS timelines, translating into a timely processing rate of 90.6 percent. The rejection rate during this period declined to 7.2 percent, despite the higher overall application load.

The comparison reveals a notable improvement of 7.7 percentage points in timely processing and a decline of 3.7 percentage points in rejection rates between the two periods. Importantly, these


improvements occurred alongside a significant expansion in citizen engagement with digital service platforms.

While this descriptive analysis does not establish causal attribution, the temporal association between the introduction of automated appeals and the observed improvement in compliance indicators suggests that embedding accountability mechanisms within the digital workflow may have contributed to strengthening adherence to statutory timelines. The findings provide preliminary evidence that automation of enforcement mechanisms can coincide with improved service delivery performance in high-volume public service systems.

7.4 AAS and Service Delivery Performance

Trends in Appeal Volumes and Appeal Shares

The introduction of the Automatic Appeal System in September 2021 marked a structural shift in the enforcement architecture of the Haryana Right to Service framework. Prior to AAS, the appeals mechanism under the RTS Act was citizen-initiated and manual, requiring individuals to independently file grievances when statutory timelines were breached. As documented in conversations with the RTS Commissioner, this design resulted in extremely low appeal volumes despite widespread delays — a classic manifestation of the gap between formal legal entitlements and their practical enforcement. In 2021, only 19,464 appeals were recorded against a processing base of over 12.5 million applications, translating to an appeal rate of 0.15 percent. This figure almost certainly understates the true incidence of delayed disposal, given that the vast majority of timeline breaches went uncontested.




Following the operationalisation and expansion of AAS — which automatically generates and escalates appeals whenever a statutory deadline is breached without requiring any citizen action — appeal volumes rose sharply. By 2022, appeals had increased to approximately 450,000, and by 2025, the system recorded over 930,000 appeals in a single year. Expressed as a share of total processed applications, the appeal rate rose from 0.15 percent in 2021 to 5.32 percent in 2025. A naive reading of this trajectory might suggest a deterioration in service delivery performance. However, such an interpretation conflates enforcement coverage with administrative failure. The rise in appeal volumes following AAS is more appropriately understood as the surfacing of a pre-existing but previously invisible stock of non-compliance — grievances that existed in the system but were never formally registered under the earlier citizen-initiated mechanism.

A more analytically precise measure is the ratio of appeals to breached applications, where breached applications are defined as total processed applications minus those disposed of within the prescribed statutory timeline. This ratio captures the share of actual timeline violations that were converted into formal appeals — in effect, the capture rate of the enforcement system. In 2021, this ratio stood at approximately 0.77 percent, indicating that fewer than one in a hundred breaches resulted in a formal appeal. By 2022, following AAS expansion, the ratio had risen to 41.8 percent, and by 2024 it stood at 30.1 percent. In 2025 and 2026, the ratio exceeded 100 percent — a finding that requires careful interpretation and is addressed below. The directional trend is

unambiguous: AAS substantially increased the proportion of breaches that were formally registered and escalated, transforming what had been a largely dormant grievance mechanism into an active enforcement instrument.

Decomposing Appeal Trends: Volume Effect versus Deterrence Effect

A central analytical challenge in evaluating AAS effectiveness is distinguishing between two countervailing forces that simultaneously shape observed appeal volumes. The first is a coverage or volume effect: as AAS captures a larger share of breaches, appeal numbers mechanically rise even if underlying non-compliance is unchanged. The second is a deterrence effect: the anticipation of automatic appeals may induce officials to dispose of applications within statutory timelines, thereby reducing the incidence of breaches and, over time, the pool of applications eligible to generate appeals. Separating these two effects is essential for a correct interpretation of the data.



The evidence strongly supports the presence of a deterrence effect alongside the coverage effect. The absolute number of breached applications — that is, applications processed outside statutory timelines — declined dramatically over the period. In 2021, approximately 2.52 million applications were processed beyond their prescribed deadlines. By 2024, this figure had fallen to 1.40 million, and by 2026, to approximately 62,000. This represents a reduction of over 97 percent

in the volume of late disposals over five years, against a backdrop of rising application volumes. Simultaneously, appeal volumes rose from 19,000 in 2021 to 931,000 in 2025. The divergence between these two series — declining breaches and rising appeals — is the empirical signature of a system in which enforcement coverage is expanding while the underlying non-compliance it targets is contracting. This pattern is consistent with AAS functioning as a credible accountability mechanism that alters official behaviour prospectively, rather than merely recording failures after the fact.


The anomaly observed in 2025 and 2026, where appeals exceed breached applications in the same calendar year, warrants methodological caution. Several non-exclusive explanations are plausible. First, AAS operates across multiple appellate tiers — appeals escalate from the Designated Officer to the First Grievance Redressal Authority, then to the Second Grievance Redressal Authority, and ultimately to the RTS Commission — and each escalation may be counted separately in administrative records, inflating the appeal numerator relative to the underlying application count. Second, there is a stock-flow mismatch inherent in annualised data: appeals filed in 2025 may pertain to applications that breached timelines in 2024 or earlier, while the denominator of breached applications is contemporaneous. Third, applications that crossed the deadline but were subsequently regularised or reclassified may be recorded as within-RTS in the dashboard while still having generated an appeal, compressing the breach denominator post hoc. These measurement considerations do not invalidate the broader trend but underscore the need for application-level administrative data to construct precise appeal-to-breach ratios at the transactional level — a limitation the present study shares with aggregate-data analyses of comparable RTS frameworks elsewhere in India.

RTS Compliance and the Structural Break at 2021–22

The most direct measure of service delivery performance under the RTS framework is the compliance rate — the share of processed applications disposed of within the statutorily prescribed timeline. This measure is preferable to throughput indicators such as overall completion rates, which, as demonstrated in the department-wise analysis, can remain high even when a substantial proportion of disposals occur after the deadline has elapsed.

The compliance rate data reveal a clear structural break at the point of AAS introduction. In 2020 and 2021 — years in which the COVID-19 pandemic placed significant strain on administrative

capacity — the compliance rate stood at 81 and 80 percent respectively, its lowest levels in the observed period. In 2022, the first full year of substantive AAS operation following its September 2021 launch, the compliance rate rose sharply to 91 percent, an improvement of approximately 11 percentage points in a single year. It has not fallen below that level in any subsequent year, reaching 96 percent by 2025 and 97 percent in the partial-year data for 2026. The symmetry is notable: the breach rate, which had stood at 20 percent in 2021, fell to 9 percent in 2022 and to below 3 percent by 2025–26.



This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that AAS introduced a credible enforcement signal that altered the incentive structure facing service delivery officials. By embedding accountability into the workflow — making appeal generation automatic rather than citizen-dependent — the system removed the de facto impunity that had sustained delayed disposal under the earlier manual mechanism. The structural break in 2021–22 is precisely timed relative to AAS expansion, and the sustained improvement thereafter suggests that the effect was durable rather than transitory.

It bears emphasis that the aggregate nature of the data precludes a formal causal identification of the AAS effect. The absence of application-level panel data means that it is not possible to apply a difference-in-differences or event-study estimator that would isolate AAS impact from concurrent factors — including, notably, the post-pandemic administrative recovery and the continued expansion of services notified under the RTS Act. The compliance improvement

observed from 2022 onwards may therefore partly reflect a rebound from pandemic-related disruption rather than a pure AAS effect. This confound is difficult to resolve without micro-data or a credible counterfactual. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the compliance improvement, its precise timing relative to the AAS intervention, and its sustained character over multiple subsequent years together constitute suggestive evidence that AAS contributed meaningfully to the observed gains.

A further corroborating observation concerns rejection rates. The share of applications rejected — as a proportion of total processed applications — declined steadily from 13 percent in 2020 to 4 percent in 2025. This trend rules out the possibility that compliance improvements were achieved through selective screening, whereby departments improved their timeliness figures by rejecting difficult or borderline applications upfront rather than processing them. The simultaneous improvement in compliance and decline in rejections implies that a growing proportion of applications is being substantively processed and disposed of within timeline, rather than being screened out to artificially inflate performance metrics.

Taken together, the three analytical dimensions examined here — appeal share trends, the decomposition of volume and deterrence effects, and the compliance rate trajectory — converge on a consistent picture. The Automatic Appeal System appears to have materially strengthened the enforcement architecture of the Haryana RTS framework, increasing the capture rate of timeline breaches, inducing a sustained improvement in within-timeline compliance, and reducing the volume of late disposals even as overall application volumes grew substantially. These findings, while descriptive in nature, provide a robust empirical foundation for situating Haryana's AAS within the broader literature on automated accountability mechanisms in public service delivery, and for informing the design of analogous systems in other state contexts.

7.5 Department-wise Appeals: Onboarding Dynamics, Correction Patterns, and Persistent Non-Compliance

The combined analysis of year-wise appeal shares and AAS service onboarding data across departments reveals four empirically distinguishable patterns that together constitute a coherent account of how automated accountability mechanisms interact with administrative behaviour over time. These patterns are summarised in Table 9 and illustrated with longitudinal evidence for selected departments in Table 10. Collectively, they demonstrate that the appropriate interpretation

of appeal trends cannot be based on aggregate volume alone — the expansion of AAS coverage, the timing of departmental onboarding, and the structural characteristics of service portfolios must all be read alongside the share data.

Table 9: Typology of Department-wise Appeal Patterns under AAS

Pattern	Defining Characteristic	Representative Departments	Empirical Remarks
Pattern I Onboarding Shock	Sharp spike in appeal share in the year of AAS service onboarding, followed by rapid decline in subsequent years — without new onboarding	Police, HSVP (2022), Haryana Excise & Taxation, Welfare of SCs & BCs (2022 onboarding), UHBVN 2nd wave (2025)	Share >5% at peak; falls to <2% within one to two years; decline occurs with zero new service additions
Pattern II Strong Deterrence Effect	Pronounced and sustained collapse in appeal share following an initial spike, falling well below pre-AAS baseline and remaining low across multiple years	Police (peak 7.4% → 0.6% by 2025), Welfare of SCs & BCs (peak 29.3% → 1.3%), Social Justice & Empowerment (peak 3.7% → 0.4%)	Peak-to-2025 decline exceeds 80%; low share sustained for 2+ consecutive years without new onboarding
Pattern III Persistent Non-compliance	Sustained high appeal share across multiple years, not attributable to new service onboarding — reflecting structural or capacity constraints rather than behavioural non-response	Revenue & Disaster Management (23–36% in all years), Health Services (rising from 2.7% in 2022 to 14.3% in 2024 with minimal onboarding), PHED, DHBVN	Share >4% in four or more consecutive years; no proportionate correction visible despite enforcement pressure
Pattern IV Late Entrant Surge	Zero or negligible appeals until 2024–25 onboarding, followed by rapid and large surge — reproducing the onboarding shock one cycle later than early-adopting departments	Transport (34 services in 2024; 12.4% share in 2026), BOCW Board (4.6% in 2025 from 1 service), Women & Child Development, Urban Local Bodies (gradual accumulation)	First significant share (>2%) only in 2024 or 2025; closely tracks service onboarding timeline

Pattern I: Onboarding Shock

The most consistent finding across the dataset is that a department's appeal share spikes sharply in the year of, or immediately following, significant AAS service onboarding — and then declines,

often to a level substantially below the pre-onboarding baseline. This onboarding shock reflects the capture of a pre-existing stock of latent non-compliance: when a department's services are enrolled in AAS for the first time, the automated system records breaches that had previously gone unregistered under the manual appeals mechanism. The spike is therefore an artefact of expanding enforcement coverage rather than a genuine deterioration in administrative performance.

The Police Department offers the clearest illustration. With 19 services onboarded in 2022, its appeal share rose immediately to 7.4 percent of all system appeals — the largest single-year debut by any non-utility department in that year. By 2023, with no new service additions, the share collapsed to 0.7 percent and has remained at or below that level since. HSVP presents a more complex version of the same pattern: three successive rounds of onboarding in 2022 (31 services), 2024 (12 services), and 2025 (25 services) each produced a share spike, with the share declining between rounds. The 2025 onboarding, notably, was associated with a decline rather than a rise in share — from 11.8 percent in 2024 to 4.9 percent in 2025 — which itself constitutes evidence of improving compliance on newly enrolled services, a sign that the onboarding shock is becoming less severe as departments accumulate experience with the AAS framework. UHBVN's 2025 surge — from 3.4 percent to 13.5 percent coinciding with 37 new services enrolled — and DHBVN's contemporaneous rise from 8.8 percent to 13.0 percent with 46 new services are consistent with the same onboarding dynamic, occurring one enforcement cycle later than the 2022 cohort of departments.

The onboarding shock pattern carries an important methodological implication: appeal shares should not be interpreted as direct indicators of administrative performance without controlling for the year and scale of service onboarding. A rising share in a year of substantial new onboarding is an expected outcome of the system's expanding reach, not evidence of worsening compliance.

Pattern II: Strong Deterrence Effect

A subset of departments exhibits not merely a transient onboarding shock but a sharp, sustained, and irreversible fall in appeal share — one that goes well below any pre-AAS baseline and remains there across multiple years without new onboarding. This constitutes direct evidence of a deterrence effect: officials in these departments responded to the enforcement signal embedded in AAS by improving compliance durably, rather than reverting to earlier behaviour once the initial shock subsided.

Table 10: Year-wise Appeal Shares and AAS Onboarding — Selected Departments (2021–2026)

Department	Pattern	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026*	AAS Services Onboarded (year)
		Appeal share (%)	Appeal share (%)	Appeal share (%)	Appeal share (%)	Appeal share (%)	Appeal share (%)	
Police	<i>I — Onboarding shock</i>	—	7.4	0.7	1.7	0.6	0.7	19 (2022)
HSVP	<i>I/oscillating</i>	—	21.6	6.2	11.8	4.9	5.9	31 (2022) 12 (2024) 25 (2025)
Haryana Excise & Taxation	<i>I — Onboarding shock</i>	—	2.4	0.7	0.3	0.4	1.1	22 (2022)
Welfare of SCs & BCs	<i>II — Strong deterrence</i>	—	9.6	29.3	5.2	1.3	1.7	6 (2022)
Social Justice & Empowerment	<i>II — Strong deterrence</i>	0.9	3.7	0.7	3.6	0.4	0.3	10 (2021) 1 (2022)
Revenue & Disaster Management	<i>III — Persistent</i>	26.6	31.2	36	33.9	23.9	21.3	11 (2021)
Health Services	<i>III — Persistent anomaly</i>	—	2.7	4.2	14.3	9.5	5.1	3 (2022) 2 (2023)
DHBVN	<i>III — Partial correction</i>	39	6.9	7.2	8.8	13	9.6	8 (2021) 46 (2025)
UHBVN	<i>I — 2nd wave shock</i>	20.6	2.2	1.5	3.4	13.5	7.9	9 (2021) 37 (2025)
Transport	<i>IV — Late entrant</i>	—	—	—	4.3	4.3	12.4	34 (2024)
Urban Local Bodies	<i>IV — Gradual accumulator</i>	—	1.3	2.1	2.7	7.3	8.2	10 (2022) 10 (2025)
Women & Child Development	<i>IV — Late entrant</i>	—	0.05	0	0.4	4.6	2.7	4 (2022) 3 (2025)
BOCW Board	<i>IV — Late entrant</i>	—	—	—	0.04	4.6	0	1 (2024)
PHED	<i>III — Persistent</i>	11.4	2.8	1.9	4.7	4.6	5.9	7 (2021) 1 (2025)

Source: NCGG analysis based on AAS dashboard (updated 29.12.2025). Appeal shares expressed as percentage of total system appeals in each year. * 2026 figures cover a partial year (January–March). Colour coding corresponds to pattern typology in Table X.

Welfare of SCs and BCs is the most striking case in the entire dataset. Onboarded with six services in 2022 (generating a 9.6 percent share), the department's share then exploded to 29.3 percent in 2023 — the single highest departmental share recorded in any year — before collapsing to 5.2 percent in 2024 and 1.3 percent in 2025, with zero new service additions in 2023, 2024, or 2025. The 2023 peak, occurring a year after onboarding rather than simultaneously, likely reflects a

processing backlog whose statutory deadlines elapsed only after the department was enrolled — the first applications filed near the time of onboarding breached their timelines several months later and surfaced as a concentrated batch of appeals. The subsequent collapse, from nearly one-third of all system appeals to barely one percent in two years, represents the sharpest deterrence signal in the data. Police and Social Justice and Empowerment follow structurally similar trajectories, with peak-to-2025 declines of approximately 92 and 89 percent respectively. In all three cases, the correction is sustained across three or more consecutive years with no reversal, indicating that the behavioural change is institutional rather than temporary.

Pattern III: Persistent non-compliance

Against the backdrop of correction observed in Patterns I and II, two departments stand out for their sustained high appeal shares that are not attributable to new service onboarding: Revenue and Disaster Management, and Health Services. These departments represent cases where the deterrence effect of AAS has not produced the correction observed elsewhere, pointing to structural or capacity constraints that blunt the behavioural response.

Revenue and Disaster Management has held between 23 and 36 percent of all system appeals in every year since 2021, with no new AAS onboarding after the initial 11 services enrolled in that year. Its share has declined gradually — from a peak of 36 percent in 2023 to 21 percent in 2026 — but remains dominant, reflecting both the enormous volume of Revenue services and their inherent procedural complexity. Land records, caste and income certificates, and domicile-related services frequently require field verification, documentary authentication, or inter-departmental coordination that cannot easily be compressed within statutory timelines. The persistent appeal share in Revenue is therefore partly a function of service design rather than simply official non-responsiveness — a design tension within AAS that the enforcement mechanism alone cannot resolve.

Health Services presents a more analytically concerning picture. Onboarded with three services in 2022 and two more in 2023, its appeal share rose consistently from 2.7 percent in 2022 to 4.2 percent in 2023 and then to 14.3 percent in 2024 — with zero new service onboarding in 2024. This onboarding-independent growth in non-compliance makes Health Services the only major department in the dataset that displays neither a correction effect nor a purely structural explanation for its persistence. The 14.3 percent peak in 2024, achieved without any new enrolment, implies a

genuine and worsening compliance failure rather than an artefact of coverage expansion. A partial recovery to 9.5 percent in 2025 is evident, but the trajectory remains anomalous relative to all comparable departments. Sustained pandemic-related administrative pressure and high workload intensity are plausible contributing factors, but the absence of a deterrence response warrants targeted policy attention beyond the automated appeals mechanism.

Pattern IV: Late Entrant Surge

A final group of departments — Transport, BOCW Board, Women and Child Development, and Urban Local Bodies — entered AAS only in 2024 or 2025, producing their first significant appeal shares well after the system's initial rollout and accounting for a substantial share of the aggregate appeals surge observed in 2025. Their emergence is consistent with the onboarding shock mechanism identified in Pattern I, reproduced one enforcement cycle later as the third wave of departmental integration.

Transport is the most consequential of the late entrants. Following the onboarding of 34 services in 2024, it generated no appeals in that year — consistent with the lag between deadline enrollment and the first breach of statutory timelines — and then surged to a 4.3 percent share in 2025 and 12.4 percent in the partial-year 2026 data. If this trajectory follows the pattern of earlier entrants, a correction should be expected in 2026 or 2027 as enforcement pressure induces compliance improvement. Urban Local Bodies displays the most gradual accumulation among late entrants, rising steadily from 1.3 percent in 2022 to 8.2 percent in 2026 across two rounds of onboarding, suggesting that its services generate a persistent and growing backlog rather than a sharp initial shock. BOCW Board's pattern is the most compressed: a single service onboarded in 2024 produced a 4.6 percent share in 2025 followed by zero in 2026, pointing either to rapid resolution of a concentrated backlog or to a data recording issue that warrants verification.

Synthesis: A Departmental Lifecycle Under AAS

The four patterns collectively describe a lifecycle through which most departments pass upon AAS integration. In the first stage — onboarding exposure — entry into the automated enforcement system surfaces a backlog of latent non-compliance as a spike in appeal share. In the second stage — correction — departments respond to the enforcement signal by improving compliance, and the share falls, often to well below the pre-spike level. In the third stage — steady state — departments

settle into a level of residual non-compliance that reflects either irreducible structural constraints, ongoing capacity pressures, or continued coverage expansion through new service additions.

The speed and completeness of the transition through these stages varies systematically. Departments with discrete, administratively simple, and citizen-initiated services — Police, Haryana Excise, Social Justice — correct quickly and completely. Departments with complex, field-dependent, or high-volume service portfolios — Revenue, Health Services, the electricity utilities — correct partially or incompletely. This variation suggests that AAS functions as a highly effective deterrent for straightforward regulatory services, and as a partial deterrent for complex administrative ones, with Health Services representing an outlier that may require complementary interventions beyond the automated accountability mechanism.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the appropriate metric for evaluating AAS effectiveness at the department level is not the appeal volume per se, but the speed and depth of the post-onboarding correction. By this metric, the system has delivered strong deterrence effects across a majority of onboarded departments, while identifying a smaller group where structural or capacity constraints require targeted administrative attention that the automated enforcement architecture alone cannot provide.

Section VIII: Construction of the RTS Performance Index (RPI)

The assessment of the Right to Service (RTS) framework in Haryana requires an analytical structure that captures not only the volume of service delivery but also the quality of statutory compliance and the functioning of the appeal mechanism under the Auto Appeal System (AAS). To enable structured inter-departmental comparison, we now construct a composite RTS Performance Index (RPI). As discussed above, the RTS–AAS framework operates along two interconnected dimensions: (i) service delivery performance, and (ii) appeal and enforcement performance. The index includes four components: Timeliness, Appeal Pressure, Resolution Strength, and Escalation Severity.

Indicators Used in the Index

(i) Timeliness Ratio (T)

$T = \text{Completed Within RTS Recently} / \text{Total Completed}$

(ii) Appeal Pressure Ratio (AP)

$AP = \text{Total Appeals} / \text{Completed Within RTS Recently}$

(iii) Resolution Strength Ratio (RS)

$RS = \text{Resolved Appeals} / \text{Total Appeals}$

(iv) Escalation Severity Ratio (ES)

$ES = \text{Escalated Appeals} / \text{Total Appeals}$

Standardization and Index Construction

For positive indicators: $X' = (X - \min(X)) / (\max(X) - \min(X))$

For negative indicators: $X' = 1 - (X - \min(X)) / (\max(X) - \min(X))$

RTS performance Index (RPI) = $(T' + AP' + RS' + ES') / 4$

The Right to Service Performance Index (RPI) provides a composite measure of departmental performance under the RTS framework by combining indicators related to service completion, timeliness of delivery, pendency, and appeal outcomes. The index ranges between 0 and 1, where higher values indicate relatively stronger performance across these operational dimensions.

The results are presented in table 7. We find considerable variation across departments. The highest RPI values are observed among several higher education institutions and specialized departments. Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind records the highest score (0.987), followed by Kurukshetra University (0.901) and Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (0.899). Other high-ranking departments include the Chief Electrical Inspector Department, Maharishi Dayanand University, and Guru Jambheshwar University of Science and Technology. These entities generally handle a relatively smaller portfolio of services and application volumes, which may contribute to higher completion and compliance ratios reflected in the index.

Among major administrative departments handling larger service volumes, the Police Department (rank 8), Agriculture Department (rank 12), Employment Department (rank 13), and the two state electricity utilities—UHBVN (rank 17) and DHBVN (rank 20)—also record relatively strong RPI values, indicating comparatively stable service completion and appeal management performance despite higher application loads. Similarly, departments such as Social Justice and Empowerment, Industries and Commerce, and Revenue and Disaster Management fall within the mid–upper range

of the index, suggesting moderate overall performance across the selected indicators. A large group of departments lies in the middle band of the index, with RPI values between roughly 0.60 and 0.70. These include Transport, Fisheries, Town and Country Planning, Public Health Engineering (PHED), and the Food Civil Supplies and Consumer Affairs Department. Departments in this category typically show acceptable completion levels but exhibit relatively lower RTS timeliness or moderate levels of pendency and appeals.

At the lower end of the index, several departments display comparatively weaker scores. These include the Directorate of Fire and Emergency Services (0.394), the Labour Department (0.427), and Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa (0.448). The lowest RPI value is observed for the Directorate of MSME (0.247), indicating comparatively weaker performance across the indicators used in constructing the index. Such lower scores may reflect higher pendency, lower compliance with RTS timelines, or relatively greater escalation of appeals.

Overall, the average RPI across departments is approximately 0.50, suggesting moderate system-wide performance under the RTS framework. The distribution of scores indicates that while a number of departments demonstrate relatively strong compliance and service delivery outcomes, there remains substantial variation across departments. This variation highlights differences in service portfolios, application loads, administrative capacity, and the extent of compliance with statutory timelines across the RTS ecosystem in Haryana.

This dominance of auto-generated appeals reflects a defining feature of the AAS architecture: appeals are triggered automatically upon the expiry of RTS timelines, without requiring any active intervention from citizens. This significantly lowers the transaction costs.

Table 7: RTS Performance Index in Haryana

Sl. No.	Department	RPI	Rank
1	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind	0.987	1
2	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra	0.901	2
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonepat)	0.899	3
4	Chief Electrical Inspector Department	0.875	4
5	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak	0.855	5
6	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar	0.823	6
7	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)	0.798	7
8	Police Department	0.765	8
9	Haryana State Board of Technical Education	0.762	9
10	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority	0.759	10
11	Board of School Education Haryana	0.758	11
12	Agriculture Department	0.756	12
13	Employment Department	0.754	13
14	Dada Lakhmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts	0.750	14
15	Haryana Women Development Corporation	0.745	15
16	Printing And Stationery Department	0.741	16
17	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN	0.740	17
18	Health Services Department	0.733	18
19	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority	0.729	19
20	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN	0.722	20
21	Social Justice And Empowerment	0.720	21
22	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency	0.719	22
23	Animal Husbandry and Dairying	0.713	23
24	Industries and Commerce Department	0.706	24
25	Revenue & Disaster Management Department	0.703	25
26	Welfare of SCs And BCs	0.700	26
27	Rural Development Department, Haryana	0.679	27
28	Public Health And Engineering-PHED	0.671	28
29	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department	0.666	29
30	Cooperation Department	0.664	30
31	Transport Department	0.664	31
32	Fisheries Department	0.656	32
33	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	0.653	33
34	Town And Country Planning	0.633	34
35	Science and Technology Department	0.608	35
36	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)	0.603	36
37	Haryana Forest Department	0.590	37
38	Haryana Excise & Taxation	0.588	38
39	Horticulture Department	0.581	39
40	Urban Local Bodies	0.574	40
41	Housing Board	0.564	41
42	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)	0.540	42
43	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department	0.516	43
44	Department of Mines & Geology	0.510	44
45	Women and Child Development Department	0.490	45
46	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran	0.485	46
47	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages	0.482	47
48	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa	0.448	48
49	Labour Department	0.427	49
50	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana	0.394	50
51	Directorate of MSME	0.247	51
	Grand Total	0.500	

Source: NCGG analysis based on SARAL & AAS dashboard.

Section IX Best practices and recommendations

This paper has examined the institutional trajectory and operational performance of the Haryana Right to Service framework across three interconnected dimensions — statutory notification under the RTS Act, digital service delivery through the Antyodaya SARAL portal, and automated enforcement through the Automatic Appeal System. Drawing on aggregate administrative data from both platforms, it has traced the evolution of this layered architecture from the initial phase of legal grounding between 2015 and 2018, through the gradual convergence of legal and digital systems between 2019 and 2021, to the rapid

consolidation and coverage expansion of the post-2022 period. The empirical analysis has assessed trends in service delivery performance, the aggregate functioning of AAS, departmental variation in appeal patterns, and the distribution of composite performance across the system.

The Haryana model, as the paper shows, demonstrates that service guarantee legislation achieves its potential not through enactment alone but through sequential layering of legal, digital, and enforcement mechanisms. The RTS Act provides the statutory foundation; SARAL provides the citizen-facing interface and the data infrastructure for monitoring compliance; and AAS provides the enforcement arm that gave the statutory guarantee operational teeth. Each layer is necessary but insufficient on its own. The critical analytical insight is that it is the combination of these three elements and specifically the introduction of AAS to automate what had previously depended on citizen initiative that produced improvements in service delivery performance.

Our analysis based on the aggregate data shows that the RTS compliance rate improved from 80 percent in 2021 to 96 percent by 2025, representing a 16-percentage point structural improvement over four years. This improvement occurred alongside a more than doubling of application volumes, from 12.6 million in 2021 to 17.9 million in 2025, indicating that the compliance gains reflect genuine changes in administrative behaviour rather than a reduction in workload. The simultaneous decline in the rejection rate from 13 percent in 2020 to 4 percent in 2025 rules out the possibility that compliance improvements were achieved through selective screening of applications. Taken together, these trends provide suggestive evidence that embedding automated accountability into the service delivery workflow induced a sustained improvement in administrative timeliness.

The Automatic Appeal System has processed 2.48 million appeals since its inception, with an overall resolution rate of 89.9 percent. The volume of applications breached beyond statutory timelines fell by over 97 percent between 2021 and 2026 from 2.52 million to approximately 62,000, while appeal volumes simultaneously rose, reflecting a system in which enforcement coverage expanded as underlying non-compliance contracted. This divergence between declining breaches and rising appeals is the empirical signature of the deterrence effect: AAS altered official behaviour prospectively, inducing compliance before breaches occurred rather than merely recording them after the fact.

Section X Future Scope of Research

Future Scope of Research

The present study has relied primarily on aggregate administrative data drawn from the Antyodaya SARAL portal and the Automatic Appeal System (AAS) dashboard to examine the evolution of Haryana's Right to Service (RTS) framework and its implications for service delivery and

automated accountability. While the analysis provides a comprehensive picture of the institutional architecture and broad performance trends, it also highlights several important avenues for future research.

The most immediate extension of this work lies in the use of application-level administrative data. The Government of Haryana maintains detailed transaction-level records containing unique application identifiers, timestamps for every stage of processing, designated officers, appeal histories, and final service outcomes. Access to such micro-data, if provided to researchers by the Government of Haryana, would substantially enhance the scope of empirical analysis. It would enable researchers to trace the complete life cycle of individual applications, measure actual turnaround times (TAT), identify the precise stages where delays occur, estimate the probability of appeals conditional on service characteristics, and distinguish administrative delays from citizen-induced delays arising from incomplete documentation or other procedural deficiencies.

More importantly, application-level data would permit rigorous causal evaluation of the Automatic Appeal System. Since services were onboarded onto AAS at different points in time, the staggered rollout creates a natural setting for quasi-experimental research. Difference-in-differences, event-study, or staggered treatment estimators could be employed to isolate the causal effect of automated appeals on statutory compliance, processing time, pendency, and departmental behaviour. Such analyses would provide considerably stronger evidence on whether the observed improvements in service delivery can be attributed to AAS rather than to contemporaneous administrative reforms, post-pandemic recovery, or improvements in digital infrastructure.

A second avenue concerns understanding citizens' interaction with the RTS ecosystem. Administrative dashboards record applications and appeals but reveal little about citizens' experiences of accessing public services. Future studies combining administrative records with household surveys, citizen satisfaction surveys, or qualitative interviews could examine awareness of RTS provisions, the usability of digital platforms, barriers faced by digitally disadvantaged groups, perceptions of fairness and transparency, trust in public institutions, and the extent to which automated grievance redressal influences citizens' willingness to engage with government. Such evidence would complement administrative indicators by providing a citizen-centred assessment of service delivery reforms.

Third, future research should examine the behaviour of public officials and administrative organisations under automated accountability. The introduction of AAS fundamentally changes bureaucratic incentives by making delays automatically visible and subject to escalation. Application-level administrative records, combined with departmental characteristics and staffing information, would make it possible to investigate whether automated monitoring changes officials' behaviour, reduces discretionary delays, improves organisational efficiency, or generates unintended consequences such as strategic processing, defensive decision-making, or selective rejection of applications. Such questions remain largely unexplored within the literature on digital governance and public administration.

A fourth direction relates to institutional heterogeneity across services and departments. The present study demonstrates considerable variation in service volumes, compliance rates, appeal intensity, and onboarding trajectories across departments. Future research may investigate how these differences are shaped by service complexity, documentary requirements, organisational capacity, staffing patterns, degree of digitisation, and inter-departmental workflow dependencies. Such analyses would help explain why some departments adapt rapidly to automated accountability while others continue to exhibit persistent compliance challenges.

Taken together, these directions indicate that the present study should be viewed as an initial empirical assessment of Haryana's evolving RTS architecture rather than a final evaluation. As richer administrative data become available and digital governance systems mature, future research can move beyond descriptive performance measurement towards causal evaluation, behavioural analysis, comparative institutional assessment, and citizen-centred evaluations of public service delivery.

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Appendix

Data Mapping and Harmonization of Service Architecture

To understand the institutional and operational landscape of service delivery in Haryana, it is necessary to reconcile the three pillars of its Right to Service (RTS) framework — the statutory dimension represented by the Haryana Right to Service Act, 2014; the digital delivery infrastructure represented by the Antyodaya SARAL portal; and the accountability mechanism operationalized through the Auto Appeal System (AAS). Each of these systems maintains distinct data architectures, resulting in variations in service categorization, departmental structuring, and nomenclature. A systematic mapping exercise was therefore undertaken to construct a unified and internally consistent RTS–SARAL–AAS service architecture for this study.

Establishing a Common Departmental Framework

The first challenge in this process arose from differences in departmental coverage across platforms. As of November 2025, SARAL hosts services from 73 departments, while RTS notifications cover about 51 departments, as issued periodically by the Department of Administrative Reforms, Government of Haryana. Since AAS operates as an overlay on SARAL, the latter’s departmental structure provides the most comprehensive representation of the operational service universe. Accordingly, SARAL departments were adopted as the base framework for mapping RTS-notified services.

Under this approach, the services notified under RTS were systematically matched with their digital counterparts on SARAL based on department name, service title, and description. This harmonized dataset enables a unified analysis of service delivery across legal, digital, and accountability layers.

Scope of Mapping

The Antyodaya SARAL portal at the time of writing this paper lists 1,015 government-to-citizen services, whereas the compiled dataset of RTS notifications contains 797 services. Through detailed matching and manual verification, 628 RTS services were successfully mapped to SARAL, representing approximately 79 percent of all notified services. However, a remaining set of 165 services could not be mapped due to differences in departmental organization, service restructuring, or absence from the SARAL dashboard. Some services, particularly those involving

local bodies or autonomous institutions, remain partially offline or operate through department-specific portals.

Handling Service Repetitions and Cross-Departmental Replications

A distinctive feature of SARAL's design is that services are classified not only by function but also by department, which leads to multiple operational instances of the same legally notified service. In contrast, the RTS framework treats each service as a single statutory entity within its parent department.

For instance, under RTS, "Issuance of Provisional Certificate" is notified as a service of the Higher Education Department. On SARAL, however, this same service is replicated across 11 universities, each maintaining a separate workflow and service ID, even though all correspond to the same RTS-notified function. Similarly, "Delivery of Queries and Grievance Handling for Industries/Businesses", notified under the Industries and Commerce Department, appears on SARAL in four distinct variants and is distributed across 20 departments, including Agriculture, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME), Mines and Geology, and Ayush. These replications expand the count of digital service entries while representing the same underlying administrative function. Accounting for such cross-departmental replications, the total number of mapped services increases from 628 unique RTS services to 879 SARAL service entries. While this inflates the numerical count, it more accurately reflects the operational dispersion of services across Haryana's e-governance ecosystem.

Analytical Rationale

Given these variations, the study retains SARAL's departmental structure as the analytical foundation for constructing a uniform service delivery architecture. A separate table is provided in the annex, presenting the RTS-notified services by department as issued over time by the Department of Administrative Reforms. The mapping of these RTS services onto the SARAL framework allows for a consistent comparison of the degree of digitization, notification coverage, and appeal integration under AAS. The harmonized dataset provides a clear and comprehensive view of how Haryana's public service delivery system functions. It helps examine how the Right to Service (RTS) Act is being implemented through the Antyodaya SARAL platform, how accountability is ensured through the Auto Appeal System (AAS), and how similar services are distributed across different departments. Together, these insights offer a unified picture of how the

legal, digital, and enforcement components of Haryana's service delivery framework work in coordination to provide timely and transparent services to citizens.

Annexure 1: Evolution of RTS notified services in Haryana (2015-2025)

Sr. No.	Department Names	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
1	Agriculture Department		8										8
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying						3				1		4
3	Chief Electrical Inspector to Government of Haryana		1						4			2	7
4	Cooperation Department						1						1
5	Department of Mines & Geology		2				4		5				11
6	Development and Panchayats Department							1					1
7	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages							1	1				2
8	Employment Department						10						10
9	Energy	26	1							23		6	56
10	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority										16		16
11	Fire Services Department		7										7
12	Fisheries Department						3		32			6	41
13	Food and Drug Administration		2	8					3				13
14	Food, Civil Supplies and consumer Affairs Department	7	1	6					7				21
15	Forest and Wildlife Department		2										2
16	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority										16		16
17	Haryana Excise & Taxation					20	3						23
18	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)						22						22
19	Haryana Micro Irrigation and Command Area Development Authority											1	1
20	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation							9					9
21	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)	8											8
22	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	8	2					9		1	3	4	27
23	Haryana State Pollution Control Board			6					2				8
24	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency									3			3
25	Haryana Women Development Corporation							1	2				3
26	Health Department/ Ayushman Bharat - Haryana Health Protection Authority									1			1
27	Health Services	4					1						5
28	Higher Education Department										4		4
29	Home Department	24	1				2	24					51
30	Horticulture Department		3									4	7
31	Housing Board	9									1		10
32	Industries and Commerce Department	17		41					4			1	63
33	Irrigation and Water Resources Department											1	1
34	Labour Department		8	3									11
35	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises			44								3	47
36	Printing And Stationery Department					1							1
37	Public Health And Engineering-PHED	4	4								1		9
38	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)		3				1					1	5
39	Revenue and Disaster Management Department	23	11	9					10	1			54
40	Rural Development Department								1				1
41	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department						18						18
42	School Education Department								4				4
43	Science and Technology Department		2										2
44	Secondary Education Department Haryana											3	3
45	Social Justice And Empowerment		9				1		1				11
46	Technical Education Department								4				4
47	Town And Country Planning	11						54	2		9	2	78
48	Transport Department	10				5			22				37
49	Urban Local Bodies	7	2					2	27				38
50	Welfare of SCs And BCs						5						5
51	Women and Child Development Department							4			1	2	7
	Grand Total	158	69	117	0	26	74	105	131	29	52	34	797
	Cumulative Total	158	227	344	344	370	444	549	680	709	761	797	

Annexure 2: Year-wise onboarding of services on Antyodaya SARAL

Sl. No.	Department names	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
1	Agriculture Department				1		3	17		2	23
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying							7	4	1	12
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonepat)									4	4
4	Board of School Education Haryana						1			2	3
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board		1	1			21	1	1		25
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani									4	4
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa									4	4
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind									4	4
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department				1		1	3	4	2	11
10	Chief Minister Relief Fund						1				1
11	Citizen Resource Information Department						1				1
12	Cooperation Department					1					1
13	Dada Lakshmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts							3	1		4
14	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN			15	1		6	19		25	66
15	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonapat			1				3			4
16	Department of Ayush							4			4
17	Department of Mines & Geology	2	1	3	1	1		3			11
18	Development and Panchayats Department					1					1
19	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana						1	10			11
20	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages						1	1		1	3
21	Directorate of MSME				1	11	4	5	26	8	55
22	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat									4	4
23	Elementary Education Department Haryana				2	1					3
24	Employment Department	1					2	6			9
25	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority						3			12	15
26	Fisheries Department									54	54
27	Food and Drug Administration							4			4
28	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department				1	7	1	3		1	13
29	General Administration					1					1
30	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar							3	1	4	8
31	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority		2	1	1			1	1	9	15
32	Gurugram University, Gurugram									4	4
33	Haryana Backward Classes and Economically Weaker Sections Kalyan Nigam			22							22
34	Haryana Excise & Taxation	1				3	19				23
35	Haryana Forest Department				1			3	2		6
36	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)						20		1		21
37	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation									9	9
38	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran	33	3	3	3	4	1	8	13	8	76
39	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)				3		8				11
40	Haryana State Board of Technical Education							4			4
41	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	13	2	1	2			8	2	1	29
42	Haryana State Pollution Control Board				1		11	3			15
43	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency									3	3
44	Haryana Women Development Corporation									3	3
45	Health Services Department	1								4	5
46	Higher Education Department					8					8
47	Home Department						2	12			14
48	Horticulture Department	2	1			1	1				5
49	Housing Board								1	9	10
50	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)									4	4
51	Industries and Commerce Department	2	1		1	18	18	4		3	47
52	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad							4			4
53	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra							1		3	4
54	Labour Department	8			1	2		3			14
55	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak									4	4
56	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal									4	4
57	Police Department			2		1	25			4	32
58	Printing And Stationery Department									1	1
59	Public Health And Engineering-PHED				1			3		8	12
60	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)				1	2	2	3			8
61	Renewable Energy Department		2			1				1	4
62	Revenue & Disaster Management Department	2		1				21	3	3	30
63	Rural Development Department, Haryana							1			1
64	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department							17		2	19
65	Science and Technology Department					1	1				2
66	Secondary Education Department Haryana				2		1			1	4
67	Social Justice And Empowerment							5	4	2	11
68	The NorthCap University									4	4
69	Town And Country Planning	2	4	1	9		1	4		5	26
70	Transport Department	34					1				35
71	Urban Local Bodies			1	1	2	4	9		9	26
72	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN			19	1		1	26	1	13	61
73	Welfare of SCs And BCs							1		4	5
74	Women and Child Development Department									7	7
	Grand Total	101	39	49	36	66	162	233	65	264	1015

Annexure 3: Year-wise on-boarding of services on AAS (2021-2025)

Sl. No.	Department name	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
1	Agriculture Department											8	8
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying								2	3		1	6
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonapat)											4	4
4	Board of School Education Haryana											3	3
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board										24	1	25
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani											4	4
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa											4	4
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind											4	4
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department										4	7	11
10	Chief Minister Relief Fund												
11	Citizen Resource Information Department												
12	Cooperation Department								1				1
13	Dada Lakshmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts									4			4
14	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN							8	9			46	63
15	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonapat									4			4
16	Department of Ayush												
17	Department of Mines & Geology											7	7
18	Development and Panchayats Department								1				1
19	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana								7				7
20	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages								2				2
21	Directorate of MSME									10		38	48
22	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat											4	4
23	Elementary Education Department Haryana												
24	Employment Department									6	2		8
25	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority											8	8
26	Fisheries Department							2	29			11	42
27	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department								8				8
28	Food and Drug Administration												
29	General Administration												
30	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar									4		4	8
31	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority											8	8
32	Gurugram University, Gurugram											4	4
33	Haryana Backward Classes and Economically Weaker Sections Kalyan Nigam												
34	Haryana Excise & Taxation								22	1			23
35	Haryana Forest Department								2				2
36	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)								19	2			21
37	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation												
38	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran								31		12	25	68
39	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)							1	9			1	11
40	Haryana State Board of Technical Education									1		3	4
41	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)							1	14			4	19
42	Haryana State Pollution Control Board												
43	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency											3	3
44	Haryana Women Development Corporation							1				2	3
45	Health Services Department								3	2			5
46	Higher Education Department												
47	Home Department												
48	Horticulture Department								2	1			3
49	Housing Board							7				3	10
50	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)											4	4
51	Industries and Commerce Department								40			2	42
52	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad									4			4
53	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra											4	4
54	Labour Department								8				8
55	Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak											4	4
56	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal											4	4
57	Police Department								19				19
58	Printing And Stationery Department							1					1
59	Public Health And Engineering-PHED							7				1	8
60	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)								3				3
61	Renewable Energy Department												
62	Revenue & Disaster Management Department							11					11
63	Rural Development Department, Haryana									1			1
64	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department								19				19
65	Science and Technology Department							2					2
66	Secondary Education Department Haryana												
67	Social Justice And Empowerment							10	1				11
68	Town And Country Planning									3		9	12
69	Transport Department											34	34
70	Urban Local Bodies								10	4		10	24
71	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN							9	9			37	55
72	Welfare of SCs And BCs								6				6
73	Women and Child Development Department								4			3	7
	Total							60	280	50	42	319	751

Annexure 4: Year-wise De-notified Services in Haryana (2015-2025)

Year													
	Department Name	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	Total
1	Agriculture Department												
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying												
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonepat)												
4	Board of School Education Haryana												
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board												
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani												
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa												
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind												
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department												
10	Chief Minister Relief Fund												
11	Citizen Resource Information Department												
12	Cooperation Department												
13	Dada Lakhmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts												
14	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN												
15	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonipat												
16	Department of Ayush												
17	Department of Mines & Geology												
18	Development and Panchayats Department												
19	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana												
20	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages												
21	Directorate of MSME												
22	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat												
23	Elementary Education Department Haryana												
24	Employment Department												
25	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority												
26	Fisheries Department											7	7
27	Food and Drug Administration												
28	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department												
29	General Administration												
30	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar												
31	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority												
32	Gurugram University, Gurugram												
33	Haryana Backward Classes and Economically Weaker Sections Kalyan Nigam												
34	Haryana Excise & Taxation				2								2
35	Haryana Forest Department												
36	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)												
37	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation												
38	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran												
39	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)												
40	Haryana State Board of Technical Education												
41	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)										4	3	7
42	Haryana State Pollution Control Board											3	3
43	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency												
44	Haryana Women Development Corporation												
45	Health Services Department												
46	Higher Education Department												
47	Home Department												
48	Horticulture Department												
49	Housing Board												
50	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)												
51	Industries and Commerce Department				2								2
52	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad												
53	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra												
54	Labour Department												
55	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak												
56	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal												
57	Police Department												
58	Printing And Stationery Department												
59	Public Health And Engineering-PHED												
60	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)												
61	Renewable Energy Department												
62	Revenue & Disaster Management Department												
63	Rural Development Department, Haryana												
64	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department												
65	Science and Technology Department												
66	Secondary Education Department Haryana												
67	Social Justice And Empowerment											2	2
68	Town And Country Planning												
69	Transport Department												
70	Urban Local Bodies											11	11
71	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN												
72	Welfare of SCs And BCs								1				1
73	Women and Child Development Department												1
	Grand Total	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	2	0	4	26	37

Annexure 5: Department-wise Status of SARAL Applications (as on 25.11.2025)

Sl. No.	Department	Overall Completion Rate	RTS Compliance Rate	Pendency ratio
1	Agriculture Department	98.78	2.29	0.04
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying	87.66	2.99	0.42
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonapat)	62.50	40.00	37.50
4	Board of School Education Haryana	99.76	3.50	0.00
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board	100.00	0.00	0.00
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani	0.00	#DIV/0!	100.00
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa	93.33	14.29	6.67
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind	0.75	66.67	96.21
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department	97.59	33.42	0.00
10	Citizen Resource Information Department	92.98	0.35	0.00
11	Cooperation Department	98.80	3.09	1.20
12	Dada Lakhmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts	100.00	2.94	0.00
13	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN	99.59	6.21	0.23
14	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonipat	0.00	#DIV/0!	100.00
15	Department of Mines & Geology	98.65	2.83	0.76
16	Development and Panchayats Department	85.03	0.00	14.97
17	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana	99.14	5.31	0.01
18	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages	99.34	0.24	0.56
19	Directorate of MSME	78.52	2.32	20.88
20	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat	100.00	100.00	0.00
21	Employment Department	98.74	3.00	0.07
22	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority	83.97	14.50	5.77
23	Fisheries Department	95.34	5.73	0.69
24	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department	96.25	10.64	1.29
25	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar	70.20	21.51	27.76
26	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority	83.24	23.53	6.59
27	Gurugram University, Gurugram	0.00		94.38
28	Haryana Backward Classes and Economically Weaker Sections Kalyan Nigam	99.94	0.00	0.06
29	Haryana Excise & Taxation	99.98	5.46	0.01
30	Haryana Forest Department	99.40	4.19	0.02
31	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)	96.45	13.94	0.00
32	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran	99.53	2.00	0.32
33	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)	98.33	2.16	0.62
34	Haryana State Board of Technical Education	99.92	3.64	0.00
35	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	98.61	3.73	0.78
36	Haryana State Pollution Control Board	97.64	7.53	0.34
37	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency	98.39	4.66	0.46
38	Haryana Women Development Corporation	99.64	0.71	0.00
39	Health Services Department	99.23	3.98	0.03
40	Home Department	65.13	3.80	29.79
41	Horticulture Department	100.00	0.08	0.00
42	Housing Board	98.25	2.93	0.41
43	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)	12.50	0.00	87.50
44	Industries and Commerce Department	98.91	3.06	0.60
45	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad	100.00	0.00	0.00
46	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra	98.49	41.31	1.20
47	Labour Department	99.89	2.78	0.00
48	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak	90.14	35.94	9.39
49	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal	100.00	4.76	0.00
50	Police Department	99.81	4.95	0.00
51	Printing And Stationery Department	97.78	9.33	0.46
52	Public Health And Engineering-PHED	99.82	1.11	0.09
53	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)	94.61	3.46	3.34
54	Revenue & Disaster Management Department	99.72	4.45	0.20
55	Rural Development Department, Haryana	98.50	1.13	1.36
56	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department	93.30	2.65	0.31
57	Science and Technology Department	100.00	0.05	0.00
58	Secondary Education Department Haryana	18.64	0.00	13.31
59	Social Justice And Empowerment	99.34	2.30	0.06
60	The NorthCap University	100.00	0.00	0.00
61	Town And Country Planning	96.78	4.15	2.33
62	Transport Department	99.94	3.74	0.02
63	Urban Local Bodies	98.97	9.08	0.18
64	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBN	99.89	6.15	0.01
65	Welfare of SCs And BCs	87.90	3.27	0.02
66	Women and Child Development Department	95.35	3.05	1.48
	Grand Total/Average	99.39	4.32	0.13

Annexure 6: Department wise Status of Appeal as on 29.12.2025

Sl. No.	Department Name	Total Appeal	Resolution Rate (%)	Escalation Rate (%)	In Process Rate (%)
1	Agriculture Department	192	99.48%	0.00%	0.52%
2	Animal Husbandry and Dairying	105643	97.58%	2.03%	0.39%
3	Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Khanpur Kalan (Sonapat)	1	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
4	Board of School Education Haryana	164	98.17%	0.00%	1.83%
5	Building and Other Construction Workers (BOCW) Board	42615	99.24%	0.76%	0.00%
6	Chaudhary Bansi Lal University, Bhiwani	10	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	Chaudhary Devi Lal University, Sirsa	19	63.16%	36.84%	0.00%
8	Chaudhary Ranbir Singh University, Jind	1754	99.94%	0.06%	0.00%
9	Chief Electrical Inspector Department	5	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	Cooperation Department	2619	96.72%	2.33%	0.95%
11	Dada Lakhmi Chand State University of Performing and Visual Arts	2	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
12	Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-DHBVN	240027	93.27%	5.44%	1.29%
13	Deenbandhu Chhotu Ram University Of Science & Technology Murthal Sonipat	11	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
14	Department of Mines & Geology	31	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%
15	Development and Panchayats Department	2809	54.36%	45.64%	0.00%
16	Directorate of Fire and Emergency Service Haryana	3200	50.44%	43.72%	5.84%
17	Directorate of Information, Public Relations & Languages	52	69.23%	28.85%	1.92%
18	Directorate of MSME	6633	68.13%	31.80%	0.08%
19	Dr Bhim Rao Ambedkar Law University, Sonapat	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
20	Employment Department	4929	98.28%	0.18%	1.54%
21	Faridabad Metropolitan Development Authority	85	90.59%	4.71%	4.71%
22	Fisheries Department	230	56.52%	0.87%	42.61%
23	Food Civil Supplies & Consumer Affairs Department	584	85.79%	13.18%	1.03%
24	Guru Jambheshwar University of Science And Technology, Hisar	48	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
25	Gurugram Metropolitan Development Authority	88	88.64%	7.95%	3.41%
26	Gurugram University, Gurugram	140	85.00%	0.71%	14.29%
27	Haryana Excise & Taxation	20476	77.85%	22.09%	0.06%
28	Haryana Forest Department	536	78.17%	20.71%	1.12%
29	Haryana Labour Welfare Board (HLWB)	8767	98.81%	0.09%	1.10%
30	Haryana Scheduled Castes Finance and Development Corporation	75	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
31	Haryana Shehari Vikas Pradhikaran	232318	75.82%	23.63%	0.55%
32	Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board(HSAMB)	1654	76.24%	22.91%	0.85%
33	Haryana State Board of Technical Education	14	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
34	Haryana State Ind and Infrastructure Development Co Ltd(HSIIDC)	4493	86.09%	11.37%	2.54%
35	Haryana State Seed Certification Agency	100	94.00%	1.00%	5.00%
36	Haryana Women Development Corporation	33	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
37	Health Services Department	186784	96.08%	3.06%	0.86%
38	Horticulture Department	1183	90.45%	9.55%	0.00%
39	Housing Board	10311	78.11%	19.21%	2.68%
40	Indira Gandhi University, Meerpur (Rewari)	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
41	Industries and Commerce Department	26418	98.60%	0.97%	0.44%
42	J.C. Bose University of Science and Technology YMCA Faridabad	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
43	Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra	284	98.59%	0.00%	1.41%
44	Labour Department	8817	59.88%	40.10%	0.01%
45	Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohtak	53	94.34%	1.89%	3.77%
46	Maharshi Valmiki Sanskrit University, Kaithal	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
47	Police Department	50576	99.66%	0.28%	0.06%
48	Printing And Stationery Department	233	90.99%	3.43%	5.58%
49	Public Health And Engineering-PHED	88719	90.76%	7.22%	2.02%
50	Public Works Department (Buildings and Roads)	462	81.82%	15.37%	2.81%
51	Revenue & Disaster Management Department	734015	91.36%	6.70%	1.95%
52	Rural Development Department, Haryana	5435	99.14%	0.35%	0.52%
53	Sainik And Ardh Sainik Welfare Department	43	65.12%	25.58%	9.30%
54	Science and Technology Department	18	88.89%	11.11%	0.00%
55	Social Justice And Empowerment	40301	96.63%	2.93%	0.44%
56	Town And Country Planning	1489	84.15%	15.25%	0.60%
57	Transport Department	83526	74.19%	6.13%	19.68%
58	Urban Local Bodies	97531	72.54%	23.97%	3.49%
59	Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam-UHBVN	162147	95.82%	3.48%	0.70%
60	Welfare of SCs And BCs	260214	96.92%	2.46%	0.63%
61	Women and Child Development Department	44826	67.80%	30.59%	1.61%
	Grand Total	2483742	89.89%	8.21%	1.90%

Annexure 7: Sources of filing appeals in Haryana (2021-2026)

Sources of filing	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	Total
Auto Appeal	99.08	99.15	98.67	94.92	97.74	98.12	97.79
Filed by Applicant through Helpline	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.47	0.47	0.86	0.33
Self-Filed by Applicant on AAS Portal	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.15	0.00	0.10
Self-Filed by Applicant on Saral Portal	0.92	0.84	1.21	4.34	1.64	1.02	1.79
Grand Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0